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Abstract
We introduce a class of tree automata that perform tests on a memory that is updated using function
symbol application and projection. The language emptiness problem for this class of tree automata is
shown to be in DEXPTIME.
We also introduce a class of set constraints with equality tests and prove its decidability by com-
pletion techniques and a reduction to tree automata with one memory.
Finally, we show how to apply these results to cryptographic protocols. We introduce a class of
cryptographic protocols and show the decidability of secrecy for an arbitrary number of agents and
an arbitrary number of (concurrent or successive) sessions, provided that only a bounded number of
new data is generated. The hypothesis on the protocol (a restricted copying ability) is shown to be
necessary: without this hypothesis, we prove that secrecy is undecidable, even for protocols without
nonces.
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1. Introduction
Set constraints were introduced in the 1980s and have been studied thoroughly since, with
applications to the analysis of programs of various styles (see [2] for a survey). Typically, the
problem of interest is to decide the satisﬁability of a conjunction of set expression inclusions
e ⊆ e′ in which the set expressions are built from variables and various constructions,
including, e.g., projection. Although some set variables may occur several times in an
expression, most classes of set constraints do not make it possible to write a set expression
for a set of terms of the form f (t, t), in which one subterm occurs more than once. One
exception is the class of constraints studied in [6].
Our motivating interest is to develop classes of cryptographic protocols for which some
form of secrecy is decidable. A historical class of decidable protocols are the so-called
ping-pong protocols [15]. Although none of the protocols of [8] belongs to this class, ping-
pong protocols remain a decidable class, while most larger classes of security protocols
are undecidable [5]. One of the main restrictions in [16,15] is that messages are built
using unary symbols only. In contrast, many protocols of interest are written using a binary
encryption symbol and a pairing function.Another restriction in [16,15] is that each protocol
participant is stateless: after a message is sent, the participant does not retain any memory
of the contents of the message. This is a signiﬁcant limitation since many protocols rely
on challenge-response steps, that require memory. A previous investigation of ping-pong
protocols with added state led to undecidability [19].
It is insightful to observe that Dolev and Yao’s result [16] can be proved using set con-
straints. This suggests a generalization of their approach to trees. A technical complication,
though, is that the generalization to trees is less expressive than one might expect: in the
case of unary functions only, a function and its inverse are set inverses of each other, in
the sense that f (f−1(X)) is precisely X. However, this is no longer true with trees: if
f−11 and f
−1
2 are the two projections corresponding to a binary function symbol f , the set
f (f−11 (X), f
−1
2 (X)) contains pairs f (t1, t2) which are not necessarily in X. In order to
increase the expressiveness of set constraints with binary functions, we need a “diagonal
construction”, enabling us to test for equalities between the members of sets.
In this paper, we introduce a new class of set constraints, allowing limited diagonal
constructions. This class is incomparable with the class sketched in [6]. We show that
satisﬁability is decidable for this class, allowing us to generalize Dolev andYao’s result to
trees. More precisely, we deﬁne a class of cryptographic protocols whose decidability does
not assume any bound on the number of sessions (whether concurrent or not), improving
over former decision results, e.g. [3,27,24] (see [12] for a survey on decidability results for
cryptographic protocols). We also allow compound keys. Protocols in the class assume a
limited copying capability for the agents. More precisely, we assume that an agent can only
blindly copy one piece of the received message in the message (s)he sends. By “blindly”
we mean here, without any type knowledge; this notion will be made precise in the paper.
Let us emphasize that this restriction is satisﬁed by almost all protocols that we found in
the literature.We also prove that this restriction is necessary: secrecy becomes undecidable
if we allow two blind copies.
Our class of set constraints does not capture all protocol concepts of interest. In particular,
as can be seen from the survey [8], many authentication protocols make use of nonces or
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time stamps, which we cannot express (more precisely, we have to assume that there is a
bounded number of nonces produced by each principal in any combination of sessions). On
the other hand, properties of protocols that are modeled using set constraints are decidable,
while nonces and timestamps typically lead to undecidability [5]. Moreover, we can express
conservative approximations of general protocols, and it is possible in principle that set
constraints with equality tests provide algorithms for determining the security of some such
protocols.
We prove the decidability of set constraints with equality tests by a reduction to an
emptiness problem for a class of tree automata with constraints. Tree automata with various
forms of constraints have been studied by several authors (see [11] for a survey). However,
the class we consider in this paper is incomparable with known decidable classes. Roughly,
we allow each state to hold one arbitrarily large memory register and restrict the use of this
memory to equality tests. Sincememory registers are updated using projections and function
application, this class is a generalization of pushdown word (alternating) automata. Despite
the generality of the class, there is a simple proof that the emptiness decision problem is in
DEXPTIME.
We start Section 2.1 by introducing Dolev andYao result and its formulation in terms of
set constraints. In Section 2.2, we recall (one possible) formal semantics of cryptographic
protocols. We also prove that, even in the absence of nonces, secrecy is undecidable.
In Section 3.1, we recall classical results on deﬁnite set constraints and generalize them
to set constraints with nonemptiness guards in Section 3.2. The results of this last section
are used in the following sections.
In Section 4,we introduce tree automatawith onememory andweprove somedecidability
results, relying on deﬁnite set constraints with non-emptiness guards. This can be seen as a
stand-alone decidability result.
Next, we introduce in Section 5 our class of set constraints with one equality, show-
ing how to reduce the satisﬁability of these constraints to the nonemptiness decision for
tree automata with one memory. The reduction is similar to the saturation process de-
scribed in [7] for set constraints with intersection, but it is more complicated due to equality
tests.
In Section 6.1 we deﬁne our class of cryptographic protocols and show how to apply the
results of the previous sections to prove that secrecy is decidable for this class.
Several technical proofs, which are not interesting by themselves, are pushed to
appendices.
2. Protocol motivation
2.1. Dolev–Yao’s result
Dolev andYao [16] consider protocols in which each principal holds a single public key
(which is known to everybody) and a corresponding private key that is known to them only.
The principals are able to build messages using plain text, encryption eX with the public
key of X and signatures dX appending the name of principal X. Here is a simple example
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from [16]:
Example 1 (Dolev and Yao [16]).
A→ B : eB(dA(eB(s)))
Alice sends to Bob a message encrypted using
Bob’s public key consisting of a signed encrypted
text s
B → A : eA(s)
Bob acknowledges the reception by sending back
to Alice the text s, encrypted using the public key
of Alice
In this model, communication channels are insecure. This allows an intruder to intercept
messages, remember them, and replace themwith alternate (possibly forged) messages. The
intruder may decrypt a message if the corresponding key has become known to him, may
append or remove signatures, and may encrypt using any public key. The secrecy question
asks whether there is a way for an intruder to get the plain text message s that is supposed to
be kept secret betweenAlice and Bob. In the above example, the answer is yes (the protocol
is insecure). For example, Dolev andYao give the following attack: After a ﬁrst session of
the protocol, the intruder, I , who overhears the messages exchanged during that session,
sends to A the message eA(dI (eA(s))), which he can build using the reply from Bob, and
receives eI (s) in return.
The possible use of set constraints in cryptographic protocols analysis has been suggested
in several papers, e.g. [20]. It is however interesting to see that the Dolev–Yao decidability
proof can be summarized using set constraints by letting I be the set of messages that can
be built by the intruder (after any number of sessions). Since I can intercept any message
of any run of the protocol, we write set constraints putting every protocol message in I . For
the example protocol above, we have
eY (dX(eY (s))) ⊆ I, eX(e−1Y (d−1X (e−1Y (I )))) ⊆ I
for every pair of principals X, Y , since Bob acknowledges a message m from Alice by
sending eA(e−1B (d
−1
A (e
−1
B (m)))). Finally, for every principal X, we express the ability of
the intruder to perform operations using public information about X:
dX(I) ⊆ I, eX(I ) ⊆ I, d−1X (I) ⊆ I
This process translates a protocol into a collection of set constraints about the set I of
messages available to the intruder. Secrecy now becomes the question whether the set
constraints, together with s /∈ I , is satisﬁable? Assuming a ﬁxed number of principals, this
is decidable in polynomial time for set constraints arising from Dolev–Yao’s ping-pong
protocols: we can compute an automaton accepting the minimal solution of the deﬁnite set
constraint and check the membership of s.
There are several restrictions in the Dolev–Yao approach. In particular, only a ﬁxed
number of principals and, as mentioned above, only unary symbols may be used. A pairing
function or a binary encryption symbol, allowing to write e.g. e(k,m) instead of ek(m), i.e.
allowing to consider keys as ﬁrst-class objects, would considerably increase the expressive
power. Such a model is presented below.
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2.2. A more expressive model
Westart fromamodel inspired byPaulson [26] and developed byMillen andRuess in [23].
However, we do not use the trace model as in [23] or [26], but a new state-transition model
similar to the MSR model proposed by Mitchell et al. [5] or those presented in [13]. Such
models are much too expressive to be decidable, thus we consider in this paper a restricted
modelwhich does not allow nonce creation but on the other handwe add an arbitrary number
of function symbols. In particular, we add compound keys and hashing. If a limited number
of nonces is allowed for each pair of principals, nonce creation can be simulated beforehand,
using additional binary function symbols N1, . . . , Nk whose arguments are agent names.
In this section, it will be shown that this restricted model is still undecidable but not so far
from decidability: Sections 4 and 5 develop a decidable class of set constraints which will
be used as a tool to extract a decidable fragment (see Section 6.1) of the model described
below.
2.2.1. Messages
They are built from a set of function symbolsF . Symbols ofF are split into several sets:
agent’s names: we assume that F contains constants and function symbols which allow to
built agent’s names.We assume that the set of agent’s names is inﬁnite. Furthermore, we
distinguish an inﬁnite subset of honest agents Ah.
invertible symbols which, intuitively, correspond to constructions whose components can
be computed by an intruder. Typically, the pairing functions belong to this set of symbols
since it is assumed that an intruder can retrieve each component u, v from a pair 〈u, v〉.
Such symbols can be applied to any term.
one way symbols which, intuitively, correspond to constructionswhose components cannot
be computed by an intruder. Typically, hash functions belong to this set. Such function
symbols can be applied to any term. In addition, we assume that there are two special
function symbols with one argument: pub() and priv(). Intuitively, pub() and priv()
return respectively a public and a private key when they are applied to agents names.
partially invertible symbols which intuitively correspond to constructions whose compo-
nents can be computed by an intruder, subject to some knowledge of the intruder. More
speciﬁcally, we will consider only one such function: encryption. (This is the only rel-
evant example we can think of, but we could generalize to more symbols in this set).
For such a binary function, which takes as argument a term k (a key) and a term u and
whose application will be written {u}k , the intruder can build {u}k when he knows u and
k and can retrieve uwhen he knows {u}k and the inverse key k−1.A priori, the encryption
function can be applied to any pair of terms so that we are not restricted to so-called
“atomic keys”. However, we will assume that the inverse of a key is the key itself, except
for expressions pub(a) and priv(a) which are inverse of each other.
The set agent’s names is denoted byAG, the set of invertible symbols by IF and the set
of one way symbols by OF . We get F = AG unionmulti IF unionmultiOF unionmulti {{_}
_
}.
Orthogonally, F is split into three sets of function symbols: those which are known
publiclyPF (for instance pub(), 〈_, _〉, {_}
_
), those which are cannot be used by the public
UF , but only by speciﬁc agents (for instance a key construction function, which is known
to a speciﬁc server only) and ﬁnally those which can be used by an intruderAF , only with
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speciﬁc arguments. This last notion is the dual of partially invertible symbols. priv() is an
example of such a symbol, which can be used by an intruder i, with the argument i only.
We will see later more examples. To summarize, the set of function symbols consists of
F = AG unionmulti IF unionmultiOF unionmulti {{_}
_
} = PF unionmulti UF unionmultiAF ,
where pub() ∈ PF , priv() ∈ AF , {_}
_
∈ PF . For each partially constructible symbol in
AF , it must be speciﬁedwhich of the argumentsmust be speciﬁc andwhich are unrestricted.
The only argument of priv() is restricted.
Moreover,we assumeaﬁnite set of sorts containing inparticular the sortsAgent,Ah,Ad,
Message such thatAh andAd are subsorts ofAgent andAgent is a subsort ofMessage,
the sort of allmessages. In addition, the set ofmessages of sortAh is exactlyAh and the set of
messages of sort Ad is exactlyAG−Ah. Elements ofAG are constants or function symbols
returning agent’s names of sortAgent.The functions symbolspub(), priv(), {_}
_
takemes-
sages as argument and return messages: pub(), priv(), {_}
_
: Message × Message →
Message. The type of other symbols has to be speciﬁed with the protocol.
The set of messages is the set of (ground) terms T (F) built over the above described
signature and whose sort is Message.
As an example of an additional sort, we could consider nonces. Note however that, in our
(un)decidability results, we will always assume that there is a bounded number of nonces;
it is then possible to represent them as messages of the form e.g. ni(a, b) where a, b are
agents (in which case ni ∈ AF ∩OF and it is restricted in its ﬁrst argument, meaning that
only a can generate ni(a, b), for any b).
Describing protocols and the behavior of honest participants requires variables ranging
either over messages or over agents. Variables ranging over agents are usually called roles.
Message schemes are terms of sort Message, built over F and possibly variables.
Example 2. We present here a protocol example (inspired by Kerberos), which will be
used as a running example through the paper.
1. A→ S : A,B
2. S → A : {〈B,K(A,B), {〈A,K(A,B)〉}shr(B)〉}shr(A)
3. A→ B : 〈{m(A,B)}K(A,B), {〈A,K(A,B)〉}shr(B)〉
4. B → A : {h(m(A,B))}K(A,B).
In words, A tells the key server S that she wants to securely communicate with B. Then
S sends back to A a message, encrypted using a key that she shares with the server and
containing a session keyK(A,B) together with a certiﬁcate which can be opened byB only.
At the third step,A sends her messagem(A,B), encrypted using the keyK(A,B), together
with the certiﬁcate, which is copied blindly from message 2. Finally, B acknowledges the
reception, sending back a digest h(m(A,B)) of the previous message, encrypted using the
shared key.
We are going to see in more detail how this protocol is formally described in the model.
For the moment, let us only make precise the components of the signature.
We assume here six sorts: Nat,Agent,Ah,Ad,Message,Key. The last sort is pro-
tocol speciﬁc. Introducing such a sort means that the agents are assumed to be able to see
whether a message is a key or not (we will discuss this hypothesis later on).
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There is a speciﬁc constant s (the server) of sort Agent. The way other agent’s names
are built is irrelevant. We could, for instance, use natural numbers together with a label for
(dis)honest participants: 0 :→ Nat, succ : Nat → Nat, ha : Nat → Ah, da : Nat →
Ad. For simplicity, in what follows, we will use the notation a1, a2, . . . for honest agents
(i.e agent of sort Ah) and i1, i2, . . . for dishonest agents (i.e. the other agents). Note that the
set of agents is inﬁnite.
Then, we use IF = {〈_, _〉, 〈_, _, _〉}. These tupling functions take arbitrary messages
as arguments and return messages.
OF = {h,m,K, shr, succ, 0, ha, da}
with h : Message → Message, m : Agent × Agent → Message, K : Agent ×
Agent→ Key, shr : Agent→ Key.
Now, the following are public symbols:
PF = {〈_, _〉, 〈_, _, _〉, pub, {_}
_
, h, 0, succ, da, ha}
In particular, anybody can know every agent name and every agents public key. Now, K
can only be used by the server
UF = {K}
Finally,
AF = {m, prv, shr}
where both symbols are restricted in their ﬁrst argument.
2.2.2. Events and global states
There are two kinds of events: message and state events. A state event is of the form
Q = S(A, n,X) where S is taken in a ﬁnite set Fs of function symbols. Typically, Fs =
{Init,Resp,Serv}. Usually, for state events of the form Serv(A, n,X), A is always equal
to s the constant representing the server. A is a ground term of sort Agent, n is a natural
number that represents the step of the protocol, and X = Mem(Q) is a tuple of messages
representing the memory held by the state. A state scheme is built in the same way, except
that the agent can be abstracted (using a role) and the messages are replaced with message
schemes.
A global state is a set (not a multiset) of events. The content of a global state is its set of
messages, written as
Cont(H) def= H ∩Messages.
Example 3 (Example 2 continued). The messages i1 orm(i1, a2) can be built from the for-
malism described in our running example. Init(i1, 1, 〈i1, a1, s〉) is a state event. Intuitively,
it represents the dishonest agent i1 ready to start a session as initiator.
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2.2.3. Inductive relations
Given a term t = f (t1, . . . , tn), parts(t) is deﬁned inductively as follows:
• if f ∈ OF ∪AG, then parts(t) def= {t},
• if f ∈ IF , then parts(t) def= {t} ∪⋃ni=1parts(ti),
• if f = {_}
_
, then parts({t1}t2}) def= {t} ∪ parts(t1).
Given a set of terms S, parts(S) is the set of parts of all terms in S.
analz(S) is the subset of parts(S) consisting of only those subterms that are accessible
to an attacker: analz(S) is the least set S′ containing S and such that:
• if f (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ S′ and f ∈ IF , then t1, . . . , tn ∈ S′,
• if {t1}t2 ∈ S′ and t−12 ∈ S′, then t1 ∈ S′.
Conversely, an attacker may use any available function to build new messages. synth(S)
is the least set of messages S′ containing S and such that
• If f ∈ PF and t1, . . . , tn ∈ S′, then f (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ S′
• If f ∈ AF , f is restricted w.r.t. its arguments j1, . . . , jk , t1, . . . , tn ∈ S′, and tj1 , . . . , tjk
∈ Ad , then f (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ S′, where Ad is the set of dishonest agents (Ad = {in | n ∈
N}).
The intruder in our model synthesizes faked messages from analyzable parts of a set
of available terms and he can iterate the process. This motivates the following deﬁnition:
fake(S) is the least set S′ containing S and such that synth(S′) ⊆ S′ and analz(S′) ⊆ S′.
Note that fake(S) is not necessarily equal to synth(analz(S)) if we do not assume atomic
keys: for instance if an intruder knows t1, {t}〈t1,t2〉, t2, he can build t by ﬁrst constructing
〈t1, t2〉 and then decrypt the message.
Example 4 (Example 3 continued). Assume that (in some state), the intruder holds the
following messages:
S1 = {{〈m(a1, i1), a2〉}h(K(a1,a2)), {h(K(a1, a2))}pub(i1),
{m(a1, a2)}K(a1,a2), pub(i1)}.
Then analz(S1) contains for instance h(K(a1, a2)),m(a1, i1) but not m(a1, a2). fake(S1)
contains for instance {〈a2, h(K(a1, a2))〉}h(m(a1,i1)).
2.2.4. Protocols
A protocol transition t is of the form Pre(t) −→ Post(t), where Pre(t) and Post(t) are
(ﬁnite) sets of messages and states. Unlike in [13], there is not any new spell: the secrecy
policy may be speciﬁed independently as presented later. Such transitions specify a possible
global state change in a way to be explained below. A transition t shows a state change for
one agent. Formally, Pre(t) and Post(t) contain at most one state event and Pre(t) contains
one state event if and only if Post(t) contains one state event.
A protocol is simply a set of protocol transitions, an initial global state H0 and a secrecy
speciﬁcation S0. When H0 is not speciﬁed, it is assumed that H0 = ∅. Both the protocol
transitions and the secrecy speciﬁcation is inﬁnite. They are however represented by means
of instances of a ﬁnite number of terms: typically, the protocol is given by a ﬁnite set of
rules ui → vi where ui and vi are ﬁnite sets of message schemes and state schemes. Such
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∅ −→


Init(A, 1, 〈A,B, s〉),
Resp(B, 1, 〈B, s〉),
Serv(s, 1, s)

 (0)
{Init(A, 1, 〈A,B, s〉)} −→ {Init(A, 2, 〈A,B, s〉), 〈A,B〉} (1){
Serv(s, 1, s)
〈A,B〉
}
−→
{
Serv(s, 2, s),
{B,K(A,B), {A,K(A,B)}shr(B)}shr(A)
}
(2){
Init(A, 2, 〈A,B, s〉),
{B,X, Y }shr(A)
}
−→
{
Init(A, 3, 〈A,B, s,X,m(A,B)〉),
〈{m(A,B)}X, Y〉
}
(3){
Resp(B, 1, 〈B, s〉),
〈{Z}X, {A,X}shr(B)〉
}
−→
{ {Resp(B, 1, 〈B, s,A,Z,X〉),
{h(Z)}X}
}
(4)
Fig. 1. Rules of the protocol.
rules represent the inﬁnite set ui → vi where  is any substitution compatible with the
types.
The secrecy policy S0 is given by an ﬁnite union of sets of the form
{t1, . . . , tn | x1, . . . , xk ∈ Ah},
where x1, . . . , xk are the free variables of the message schemes t1, . . . , tn.
S0 represents the set of messages that the intruder should not hold.
Example 5 (Example 4 continued). The protocol, as described in Example 2 is a bit sloppy.
We used there the standard notations, but, if we want to be more precise, we have to specify
for instance in message 3 howAlice retrieves the different components of the message she
sends. Typically in such protocols,A,B are roles, not agent’s names. The “B” in message 3
can be either the name sent in message 1 or the name passed in message 2 (It does not make
a difference in this particular example. But it does make a difference in other situations, as
shown by the attack on the Needham–Schroeder protocol [22]).
This protocol should not reveal the messagesm(a, b),K(a, b), shr(a) when a and b are
honest agents. This can be expressed by the following secrecy policy S0:
S0 = {m(a, b),K(a, b) | a, b ∈ Ah} ∪ {shr(a) | a ∈ Ah}.
Next, the protocol rules are given in Fig. 1. The rule 0 says that, at any time, a new session
can be started (the precondition is an empty set).After applying this rule to an instance a, b,
the agents a, b, s are ready to act as participants of a protocol session.
The rule 1 corresponds to the ﬁrst step of the protocol: any agent a who is ready to act
as A in the protocol can send the message 〈a, b〉 to s and switch to a state in which she
remembers having completed the ﬁrst step (hence the second argument is 2) and having
sent the message 〈a, b〉 to s.
Rule 2 corresponds to the second step of the protocol: if s is ready to serve a key and if the
message 〈a, b〉 has been sent, then the server switches, generates the keyK(a, b) and sends
the expected message. Note that the variablesA,B are local to the rule, hence the instances
are not necessarily the same as in the previous step: an intruder can very well perform the
ﬁrst step of the protocol, in which case there are two 〈a, b〉, 〈a′, b′〉 in the global state and
the second instance may be used instead of the ﬁrst one.
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In the rule 3, the agent a, who completed the ﬁrst steps of the protocol expects amessage of
the form {b, ,}shr(a). She can check that the message is an encrypted message containing
three components and that the ﬁrst component is an agent’s name, with whom she started
a session. However, she cannot check that the second component is indeed K(a, b) and,
similarly, she cannot open the third component (the ticket). Hence these two components
are left as local variables of the rules which can be instantiated in an arbitrary way, provided
that Y gets a term of sort Message and X gets a term of sort Key. (We assume here that
a is able to recognize whether a term has type Key or not.)
Similarly, in the last rule, the expected instance of Z ism(a, b), but it could be any faked
message: there is no way to check this.
This formal speciﬁcation of the protocol gives more precision on the abilities of each
agent. We make precise here what is expected by each participant and what is his behavior.
2.2.5. Global state transitions
Given a protocol P and a set of initial knowledge I (of the intruder), the global succes-
sion relation transforms a state H to a new state H ′. A succession is either honest, i.e. it
corresponds to an action by an agent following the protocol, or it is faked by the intruder.
• H ′ is anhonest successor ofH , denoted byhonest(P )(H,H ′), if there exists an applicable
transition t in P such that H ′ = (H\(Pre(t) ∩ States)) ∪ Post(t).
• H ′ is a fake successor of H , denoted by fake(I )(H,H ′), if there exists a ﬁeld X ∈
fake(Cont(H) ∪ I ) such that H ′ = H ∪ {X}.
In the honest case, a transition t is applicable in H if Pre(t) ⊆ H . In the fake case, the
intruder is restricted to adding only messages that can be inferred from the content of the
current state and the initial knowledge. In either case, we write global(P, I )(H,H ′). This
relation determines a logical transition system with the initial global state H0 as its initial
state. The set of reachable states of this transition system is denoted by reachable(P, I ).
2.2.6. Secrecy policy
Given the intruder’s initial knowledge I and a secrecy policy S0, a global state H is
called I, S0-secure if fake(Cont(H) ∪ I ) ∩ S0 = ∅; these states are collected in the set
secure(I, S0). Now, a protocol P is called secure if secure(I, S0) is an invariant of the
transition relation associated with P and S0 is the secrecy policy associated to P ; i.e. for
all I , reachable(P, I ) is a subset of secure(I, S0).
Remark: actually, it is sufﬁcient to prove that secure(I0, S0) is an invariant for I0 the
maximal set compatible with S0:
I0 = {m | parts(m) ∩ S0 = ∅}.
This deﬁnition is slightly different from the one given in [13] but it matches more precisely
the idea of secrecy while the deﬁnition given in [13] was an over-approximation of secrecy
in order to allow inductive proofs.
2.2.7. An undecidability result
We present now an undecidability result. Let us emphasize that we do not have here the
nonce construction. Hence, the result is stronger than the undecidability result of [18].
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Theorem 6. It is undecidable whether or not a protocol P is secure.
A proof of this result has been proposed by Even and Goldreich in [19] by reducing
the Post Correspondence Problem (PCP) to secrecy. A simpliﬁed proof was proposed by
Rusinowitch. The intuitive idea is the following one: consider a ﬁnite alphabet  and an
instance of PCP: (ui, vi)1 in, ui, vi ∈ ∗. We construct the following protocol:
A→B : {〈0, 0〉}Kab
B→A : {〈N1, N2〉}Kab
A : {〈x, y〉}Kab →B : {〈xui, yvi〉}Kab , {s}{〈xui ,xui 〉}Kab , 1 in.
The key Kab is a symmetric, private key between A an B. The last rule describes n rules
for the agent A. The left-hand side describes the message expected by A. One can show
that s remains secret if and only if there is no solution to the considered instance of PCP. A
similar protocol can be build without using composed keys.
An inconvenience to both constructions is that for each instance of PCP with no solution,
the corresponding protocol does not have one honest instance. Using Petri nets, we construct
in [9] a reduction such that the corresponding protocol is a “real” protocol in the sense that
each rule of the protocol can be played in the given order: the ﬁrst rule, then the second
and so on, i.e., there is at least an honest instance of the protocol. In addition this reduction
only uses standard cryptographic primitives, namely pairing and encryption with symmetric
keys and a ﬁxed number of roles (actually only one role) and a ﬁnite number of protocol
rules. For each reduction (using PCP or Petri nets), the intruder actually may only forwards
messages and does not need to forge new ones.
3. Deﬁnite set constraints
3.1. Deﬁnite set constraints and intersection constraints
This class of set constraints has been introduced in [21] and studied by various authors
(e.g. [7]). Each constraint is a conjunction of inclusions e1 ⊆ e2 where e1 is a set expression
and e2 is a term set expression. Term set expressions are built out of a ﬁxed ranked alphabet
of function symbols F , the symbols ,⊥ and set variables. A set expression is either a
term set expression or a union of two set expressions e1 ∪ e2, or an intersection of two set
expressions e1 ∩ e2 or the image of set expressions by some function symbol f (e1, . . . , en)
or a projection f−1i (e1) where f is a function symbol and i ∈ [1..n] if n is the rank of f .
Note that negation is not allowed.
Example 7. Here is a deﬁnite set constraint:
f−12 (X) ⊆ g(Y ), f (f (X, Y ) ∩X,X) ⊆ X
g(Y ) ∩ Y ⊆ X, a ⊆ Y
where a, f, g are function symbols and X, Y are set variables.
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Set expressions denote sets of subsets of the Herbrand universe T (F); if  assigns each
variable to some subset of T (F), then [[ ]] is deﬁned by
[[X]] def= X
[[f (e1, . . . , en)]] def= {f (t1, . . . , tn) | ∀i ∈ [1..n], ti ∈ [[ei]]}
[[e1 ∩ e2]] def= [[e1]] ∩ [[e2]]
[[f−1i (e)]] def= {ti | ∃t1, . . . , tn.f (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ [[e]]}
[[]] def= T (F)
[[⊥]] def= ∅
[[e1 ∪ e2]] def= [[e1]] ∪ [[e2]],
 satisﬁes e1 ⊆ e2 iff, [[e1]] ⊆ [[e2]]. This extends to conjunctions of inclusions.
Example 8 (Example 7 continued). The substitution  def= [X → ∅, Y → {a}] satisﬁes the
set constraints described in Example 7.
Following a standard translation (see e.g. [7]), the deﬁnite set constraints can be rewritten
(in polynomial time) into intersection constraints which are conjunction of inclusions of
one of the forms:
X ⊆ Y, f (X1, . . . , Xn) ⊆ X
X ⊆ f (Y1, . . . , Ym), f (X1, . . . , Xn) ⊆ g(Y1, . . . , Ym)
where X,X1, . . . , Xn, Y, Y1, . . . , Ym are intersections of set variables. In other words, the
constraints can be ﬂattened and union and projections eliminated thanks (in particular) to
the equivalence:
f−1i (X) ⊆ Y ⇔ X ∩ f (, . . . ,) ⊆ f (, . . . , Y,, . . .)
where the Y is in ith position and further transformations introducing new variables.
The translation  from deﬁnite set constraints to intersection constraints may require the
introduction of new variables. Formally,  preserves the solutions:
Lemma 9.  is a solution of the deﬁnite set constraintC if and only if there exists′, solution
of the intersection constraint (C), such that  is the restriction of ′ to the variables of C.
Theorem 10 (Charatonik and Podelski [7]). The satisﬁability of intersection constraints
(resp. deﬁnite set constraints) is DEXPTIME-complete and each satisﬁable constraint has
a least solution which is accepted by a ﬁnite tree automaton.
Moreover, the decision procedure provides effectively the ﬁnite tree automaton accepting
the least solution.
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3.2. Intersection constraints with nonemptiness guards
Now, we consider a slight extension of intersection constraints, yielding a result similar
to Theorem 10. If e is a set expression, let nonempty(e) be a statement which is satisﬁed
by  iff [[e]] is not empty.
We extend the formalism as follows. A ﬂat expression is either an intersection of set
variables or a set expression f (X1, . . . , Xn) where X1, . . . , Xn are intersections of set
variables. An intersection constraint with non-emptiness guards is a conjunction of clauses
nonempty(e′1), . . . , nonempty(e′n)⇒ e1 ⊆ e2,
where e′1, . . . , e′n, e1, e2 are ﬂat expressions.
The interpretation of such constraints is the expected one. Note that, of course, they
extend intersection constraints. However, the algorithm given in [7] can be applied with
slight changes only.
In other words, enriching the intersection constraints with clauses of the above form, we
still have the same result as in Theorem 10, as a corollary of [7]:
Theorem 11. The satisﬁability of intersection constraints with nonemptiness guards is
DEXPTIME-complete and each satisﬁable constraint has a least solutionwhich is effectively
accepted by a ﬁnite tree automaton.
Proof. If we want to be as self-contained as possible, we need to reproduce, at least partly,
the proof of [7]. In the next section, we will also rely on this proof.
First, we can assume that all expressions occurring in the guards also occur as members
of inclusions (if necessary, add e ⊆ e and ﬂatten again).
Now, according to [7], we saturate the constraints using the inference rules given in Fig. 2.
In this ﬁgure, X,X1, . . . , Xn,X′, X′1, . . . , X′n are intersection of set variables and e, e′,
e1, e2, e
′
1, e
′
2 are any ﬂat set expressions. If these rules are applied to intersection constraints,
we get as conclusions intersection constraints again, with the convention that expressions
f (e1, . . . , en) ∩ f (e′1, . . . , e′n) are eagerly normalized into f (e1 ∩ e′1, . . . , en ∩ e′n).
As shown in [7] the rules of Fig. 2 are correct and applying the inference rules saturates the
set constraint in deterministic exponential time (assuming that reﬂexivity and weakening
do not introduce new variables).
For every constraint , we let C be the saturated set. As in [7] again, let S be the solved
form of :
S = {f (e1, . . . , en) ⊆ X ∈ C | nonempty(f (e1, . . . , en)) ∈ C}
where X is a variable.
S is essentially the deﬁnition of a tree automaton whose states are set variables. Let
 be the substitution, assigning to each variable X, the language recognized by this tree
automaton in state X. We are going to prove that either false ∈ C or else  is the least
solution of . The minimality of  comes from automata theory. Let us concentrate on the
fact that  is a solution of .
The proof that  satisﬁes all inclusions e1 ⊆ e2 inC is identical to [7]. Consider a clause
nonempty(e1), . . . , nonempty(en)⇒ e ⊆ e′ with n1. If there is an i such that [[ei]] is
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Reﬂexivity :
e ⊆ e
Transitivity :
e1 ⊆ e2 e2 ⊆ e3
e1 ⊆ e3
Weakening :
X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xn ⊆ Xi
Compatibility
e1 ⊆ e2 e′1 ⊆ e′2
e1 ∩ e′1 ⊆ e2 ∩ e′2
Propagation 1
nonempty(e) e ⊆ e′
nonempty(e′)
Propagation 2
nonempty(X1), . . . ,nonempty(Xn)
nonempty(f (X1, . . . , Xn))
Projection
nonempty(f (X1, . . . , Xn)) f (X1, . . . , Xn) ⊆ f (X′1, . . . , X′n)
Xi ⊆ X′i
Incompatibility
nonempty(e) e ⊆ f (X1, . . . , Xn) e ⊆ g(X′1, . . . , X′m)
If f = g
false
Cut
nonempty(e) nonempty(e),⇒ e′ ⊆ e′′
⇒ e ⊆ e′
Fig. 2. Inference rules for intersection constraints.
empty, then the clause is trivially satisﬁed. Otherwise, we may assume that every ei is an
intersection variable since  satisﬁes nonempty(f (Y1, . . . , Yn)) if and only if it satisﬁes
nonempty(Y1), . . . , nonempty(Yn). Then let ei be the intersectionX1i ∩. . .∩Xkii . For every
i, there is a term ti which is accepted by the tree automaton in every state Xji . We prove
below that, if t is accepted in all states X1, . . . , Xn, then nonempty(X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xn) ∈ C .
Let us assume this for the moment. Then, by the rulesCut and Propagation 2, e ⊆ e′ ∈ C ,
which proves that  satisﬁes e ⊆ e′, thanks to [7].
We prove by induction on the size of t that, if t is accepted in all states X1, . . . , Xn, then
nonempty(X1 ∩ . . . Xn) ∈ C .
• If t is a constant, by deﬁnition of the automaton, t ⊆ Xi ∈ C for every i. Then, by
Compatibility (applied n− 1 times), t ⊆ X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xn ∈ C
• If t = f (t1, . . . , tm). Bydeﬁnition of the automaton, there are inclusionsf (ei1, . . . , eim) ⊆
Xi ∈ C such that, for every j ∈ [1..m], for every i, tj ∈ [[eij ]]. Now, we apply the
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induction hypothesis: for every j , nonempty(e1j ∩ . . . ∩ enj ) ∈ C . By Propagation 2,
nonempty(f (e11 ∩ . . . ∩ en1 , . . . , e1m ∩ . . . ∩ enm)) ∈ C . Now, by Compatibility,
f (e11 ∩ . . . ∩ en1 , . . . , e1m ∩ . . . ∩ enm)) ⊆ X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xn ∈ C
and, by Propagation 1, we conclude that nonempty(X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xn) ∈ C .
To summarize: the assignment  deﬁned by the solved form S also satisﬁes the conditional
inclusions of C , which means that C is satisﬁable whenever false /∈ C and  is then the
minimal solution of . 
In the proof of the last result, we have seen in passing that nonempty(X) is a logical
consequence of the constraint iff it belongs to the saturated set. It follows that:
Corollary 12. Deciding whether the minimal solution of a deﬁnite set constraint with non-
emptiness guards assigns the empty set to X is DEXPTIME-complete.
Actually, the DEXPTIME-hardness of this corollary is missing so far. But we can reduce
the non-emptiness problem of the intersection of n tree automata (which is DEXPTIME-
complete) by translating the deﬁnitions of the automata into intersection constraints and
adding a clause
nonempty(X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xn)⇒ a ⊆ X,
where X1, . . . , Xn are the set variables corresponding to the accepting states of the n
automata, respectively, X is a new variable and a is a constant.
4. Tree automata with one memory
The idea is to enrich the expressiveness of tree automata by allowing them to carry and
test some information. For instance, a pushdown automaton will keep a stack in its memory
and check the symbols at the top of the stack. What we do here is something similar. Our
automata work on trees instead of words and may perform more general constructions and
more general tests. We will see later as an example how to express pushdown automata in
our formalism.
Informally, a tree automaton with one memory computes bottom-up on a tree t by syn-
thesizing both a state (in a ﬁnite set of states Q) and a memory, which is a tree over some
alphabet. Each transition uses some particular function which computes the newmemory
from the memories at each direct son. Each transition may also check for equalities the
contents of the memories at each son.
Given an alphabet of function symbols , the set of functions 	 which we consider here
(and which may be used to compute on memories) is the least set of functions over T ()
which is closed by composition and containing:
• for every f ∈  of arity n, the function 
x1, ...xn.f (x1, . . . , xn),
• for every n and every 1 in, the function 
x1, . . . , xn.xi ,
• for every f ∈  of arity n and for every 1 in, the (partial) function which associates
each term f (t1, . . . , tn) with ti , which we write 
f (x).xi .
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For instance, if  contains a constant (empty stack) and unary function symbols,	 is the
set of functions which push or pop after checking the top of the stack.
Deﬁnition 13. A tree automaton with one memory is a tuple (F,,Q,Qf ,) where F
is an alphabet of input function symbols,  is an alphabet of memory function symbols,Q
is a ﬁnite set of states, Qf is a subset of ﬁnal states,  is a ﬁnite set of transition relations
of the form f (q1, . . . , qn)
c−→
F
q where
• f ∈ F is called the head symbol of the rule,
• c is a subset of {1, . . . , n}2, deﬁning an equivalence relation on {1, . . . , n}.
• F ∈ 	 such that F takes k arguments where k is the number of equivalence classes
w.r.t. c
• q1, . . . , qn, q ∈ Q, (q is the target of the rule).
A conﬁguration of the automaton consists of a state and a term in T () (the memory).
Then computations work as follows: if t = f (t1, . . . , tn) and the computation on t1, . . . , tn,
respectively yields the conﬁgurations q1, 1, . . . , qn, n, then the automaton, reading t , may
move to q,  when there is a transition rule f (q1, . . . , qn)
c−→
F
q and for every i = j ∈ c,
i = j and  = F(i1 , . . . , ik ), where i1, . . . , ik are any representatives of the equivalence
classes for c (the way ij is chosen in its equivalence class is not relevant). A tree t is
accepted by the automaton whenever there is a computation of the automaton on t yielding
a conﬁguration q,  with q ∈ Qf .
Example 14. Assume that the transitions of the automatonA are (other components of the
automaton are obvious from the context,  is the identity relation):
g(q)
−−−→

x1.x1
q f (qa, qa)
1=2−−−−−→

x1.h(x1)
q
g(qa)
−−−−−→

x1.h(x1)
q f (q, q)
1=2−−−−−→

h(x1).x1
q
a
−→
b
qa
A computation of the automaton on f (g(f (a, a)), g(a)) is displayed in Fig. 3, in which
the conﬁgurations reached at each node are displayed in a frame.
Pushdown automata (on words) perform transitions a, q,  · → q ′, ·  where a is an
input symbol, q, q ′ are states and ,,  are words over the stack alphabet (the rule pops 
and pushes ). Such a rule can be translated in the above formalism, viewing letters as unary
symbols: a(q) −−−−−→

x.−1x
q ′. If w = a1(. . . ak(_) . . .), we use here the notation w−1(x) for
a−1k (. . . (a
−1
1 (x))), the additional subscript 1 being implicit for each letter, which has only
one argument.
This translation does notmake use of equality tests.Orthogonally, it is possible to simulate
tree automata with equality tests between brothers [4]. This requires some coding, because
the function F can refer to one representative for each class only, hence we cannot keep
directly in the memory the subtree recognized so far. However, it is possible to show that
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Fig. 3. A tree t and a computation of A on t .
any language recognized by an automaton with equality tests between brothers (and, more
generally, with nonoverlapping equality tests) is also accepted by an automaton with one
memory. We do not need the projections here.
In some respect, our deﬁnition is a generalization of both models: we can both use a stack
and check for equality, and keep record of deep subtrees.We avoid overlapping tests, which
yield undecidability [25,11], because we allow only one representative of each class in the
function in the body of F .
Theorem 15. The emptiness of the language recognized by a tree automatonwith onemem-
ory is decidable in DEXPTIME. More generally, the reachability of a given conﬁguration
is decidable in DEXPTIME.
Proof. For every q ∈ Q, letMq be the subset of T () of memory contentsm such that there
is a tree t and a computation of the automaton on t yielding the conﬁguration 〈q,m〉. We
prove that the setsMq are the least solutions of the deﬁnite set constraint with non-emptiness
guards CA, consisting, for each transition rule f (q1, . . . , qn)
c−→
F
q of the inclusion
nonempty(eqi1 ), . . . , nonempty(eqik )⇒ F(eqi1 , . . . eqik ) ⊆ Xq
and eqij is the intersection for all indices l equivalent (w.r.t. c) to ij of Xql .
CA can be assumed to be an intersection constraint with non-emptiness guards (see
Section 3).
First, the assignment 0 which maps every Xq to Mq is a solution of the constraint.
Indeed, consider any clause of the above form with F = 
x1, . . . , xk.G and assume (for
simplicity) that x1, . . . , xr do not occur in G, while xr+1, . . . , xk occur (once) in G.
If [[eqij ]]0 = ∅ for every ij , then it is possible to reach conﬁgurations 〈q1,m1〉, . . . ,〈qn,mn〉 such that mj ∈ [[eqij ]]0 , i.e. mi = mj whenever i = j ∈ c. Now, consider any
termsm′1, . . . , m′k−r , respectively inMqr+1 , . . . ,Mk . There are trees t1, . . . , tr , . . . , tk such
that there are computations of the automaton on this trees yielding, respectively, the con-
ﬁgurations 〈q1,m1〉, . . . , 〈qr ,mr 〉, 〈qr+1,m′1〉, . . . , 〈qk,m′k−r 〉. From these conﬁgurations,
reading the input f , the automaton can move to the conﬁguration 〈q,G(m′1, . . . , m′k−r )〉,
hence G(m′1, . . . , m′k−r ) ∈ Mq .
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Conversely, we have to prove that any solution  of the constraint is larger than 0. Let
m ∈ Mq . There is a computation of the automaton on some tree t , yielding the conﬁguration
〈q,m〉. We prove, by induction on t , that m ∈ [[Xq ]].
• If t is a constant, then there must be a rule a −→
F
q and F = m ∈ T (). By deﬁnition,
there is a constraint F ⊆ Xq . Hence m ∈ [[Xq ]].
• Now, let t = f (t1, . . . , tn) and let f (q1, . . . , qn) c−→
F
q be the last rule applied in the
computation yielding 〈m, q〉. Let moreover 〈q1,m1〉, . . . , 〈qn,mn〉 be the conﬁgurations
corresponding to computations on t1, . . . , tn. By deﬁnition, mi = mj whenever (i, j) ∈
c and m = F(mi1 , . . . , mik ). By induction hypothesis, for every i, mi ∈ [[Xi]] and,
because of the equality constraints, mi ∈ [[eqil ]] if (il, i) ∈ c. It follows that  satisﬁes
nonempty(eqij ) for all j and, since  satisﬁes the clause associated with the rule, it
satisﬁes F(eq11 , . . . , eqik ) ⊆ Xq . In particular, m ∈ [[Xq ]].
This completes the proof that the setsMq are the least solutions of the constraint CA.
Then the non-emptiness of the language recognized by A reduces to the problem of
deciding whether at least one of some designated variables gets a non-empty set in the least
solution of the constraint. This is DEXPTIME-complete, thanks to Corollary 12. 
The result can be generalized to alternating tree automata with one memory keeping the
same complexity.Alternation here has to be understood as follows:wemay replace the states
occurring in the left hand sides of the rules with arbitrary positive Boolean combinations
of states. The above proof simply works, using additional intersections and unions.
Corollary 16. The emptiness problem of alternating tree automata with one memory is
DEXPTIME-complete.
Note however that the class of automata with one memory is neither closed under inter-
section nor complement (both yield undecidable models).
5. Set constraints with equality tests
5.1. Deﬁnition of the class
5.1.1. General set constraints with equality tests
We consider now deﬁnite set constraints as in Section 3, with non-emptiness constraints
and with an additional construction: function symbols can be labeled with equality tests,
which are conjunctions of equalities p1 = p2 between paths. The intention is to represent
sets of terms t such that the subterms at positions p1 and p2 are identical. We assume,
without loss of generality, that there is no union and no projection symbol, which, as we
have seen, is not a restriction (provided that the equality tests do not overlap projection
symbols).
We use the standard notations on terms [14]. Let us recall some of them. A position will
be a string of nonnegative integers. A term t labeled with F can be seen as a mapping from
the set Pos(t) of its positions to F . The subterm of t at position p is written t |p.
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An equality constraint c is an equivalence relation on a ﬁnite set of positions P(c). We
assume that no strict preﬁx of a position in P(c) does belong to P(c) (this restriction will
be dropped in Section 5.2.1). We will often write equality constraints as ﬁnite sets (or
ﬁnite conjunctions) of expressions p1 = p2 where p1, p2 are positions. Then, it must be
understood that c is the least equivalence relation containing the pairs (p1, p2) on the set
of positions occurring in some of the equalities. We also say that a position p is checked by
c when p ∈ P(c).
A term t satisﬁes c, which we write t  c , if every path in P(c) is a position of t and
moreover, t |p1 = t |p2 (the subterms of t at positions p1 and p2 are identical).
We enrich the set expressions of Section 3 with the construction f c(e1, . . . , en) where c
is an equality constraint. These expressions are interpreted as follows:
[[f c(e1, . . . , en)]] def= {t ∈ [[f (e1, . . . , en)]] | t  c}
The set of paths in an expression e is deﬁned as follows:
(f c(e1, . . . , en))
def= {} ∪ 1 ·(e1) ∪ . . . ∪ n ·(en)
(e1 ∩ e2) def= (e1) ∪(e2)
(X) def= {}.
Let p ∈ (e). We let e|p be the set of subexpressions at position p:
e| def= {e}
(e1 ∩ e2)|i·p def= e1|i·p ∪ e2|i·p
(f c(e1, . . . , en))|i·p def= ei |p
X|i·p def= ∅.
When e|p contains only one element, we confuse e|p with this element and say that e|p
is the subexpression of e at p.
We will assume that, in every expression f c(e1, . . . , en),
P(c) ⊆ (f c(e1, . . . , en))
All other constructions are the same as in Section 3. In particular, right hand sides of
inclusions should not contain constructions f c.When c is empty, wemay omit it or write.
Example 17. f 21=12(f (Z, Y ) ∩ X, g(X) ∩ Y ) ⊆ f (Y, g(X)) is an inclusion constraint.
 = {X !→ {a, b, f (a, b)};Y !→ {b, g(a), g(b), f (a, b)};Z !→ {a, b}} is a solution of the
constraint since [[f 12=21(f (Z, Y ) ∩X, g(X) ∩ Y )]] = {f (f (a, b), g(b))}.
5.1.2. A complete deduction system
We ﬁrst design a complete deduction system and show that every satisﬁable set constraint
has a least solution. These results are not meant to be practical.
Let S be a set constraint as in the previous section, whose variables are Var(S) =
{X1, . . . , Xn}. Let  be the subset of
(
2T (F)
)n
of assignments  mapping every variable
Xi to a ﬁnite set.
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We may assume in this section that, in every clause
⇒ e ⊆ e′
the expression e′ does not contain intersection symbols. This is not a restriction as a clause
⇒ e ⊆ e′[e1 ∩ e2] is equivalent to the two clauses ⇒ e ⊆ e′[ei] for i = 1, 2.
With this assumption, we can associate with each right hand side of an inclusion e′ a term
te′ ∈ T (F,X ) such that every variable occurs only once in te′ and e′ is obtained from te′ by
substituting set variables to the variables of te′ .
We deﬁne the one step deduction relation TS on  ∪ {} as follows:
TS() def= .
If there is a clause ⇒ e ⊆ e′ in S such that    and there is a t ∈ [[e]] such that t is
not an instance of te′ , then TS() = .
Otherwise, for each clause C = ⇒ e ⊆ e′ in S
• If    , then we let C be the assignments mapping every set variable to the empty
set
• If   , then for every term t ∈ [[e]], and every set variable X, we let t,C(X) be the
set of terms t |p such that e′|p = X. Finally, we deﬁne TS() by:
[[Xi]]TS() def= [[Xi]]
⋃
C∈S,t∈[[e]]
t,C(Xi).
We let ∅ be the assignment mapping every set variable to the empty set and we deﬁne
 as the least ﬁxed point of :
(Xj ) =
∞⋃
i=1
T iS(∅)(Xj )
if T iS(∅) =  for every i and  =  otherwise.
Example 18. Consider the set constraint S consisting in the single clause C = f (a) ⊆
f (X). Then tf (X) = f (x) and [[f (a)]]∅ = {f (a)}. The term f (a) is an instance of f (x)
and f (a),C(X) = {a}.
Then, applying the deduction step, we get [[X]]TS(∅) = ∅ ∪ {a} = {a} and T 2S (∅) =
TS(∅) : (X) = {X !→ {a}}.
Proposition 19.  =  iff S is not satisﬁable.
If  = , it is the least solution of S.
Proof. It is similar to the standard result that the least ﬁxed point of the direct consequence
operator of a Horn clause set is the least model of the program.
If  = , then  is contained in any solution of S (by induction on i, T iS(∅) is
contained in any solution of S).
Now, if  = , then  is a solution of S: this is a routine veriﬁcation. 
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5.1.3. An undecidability result
As a consequence of undecidability results on tree automata with equality tests (see
e.g. [11]), the satisﬁability of such general constraints is undecidable, because of possible
overlapping tests.
Proposition 20. The satisﬁability of such general constraints (even without non-emptiness
preconditions) is undecidable.
Note that such a result is consistent with Theorem 6 and the translation of security
problems into set constraints as given in Section 6.1.We sketch the proof of this proposition,
because, even if the reader should already be convinced, the proof sheds some lights on the
restrictions we take later on.
Proof (sketch). We encode Turing machine computations. A conﬁguration is represented
as a triple containing the state, the part of the tape on the left of the head (including the head
position) and the part of the tape on the right of the head. Tape contents are encoded using
unary symbols (one for each element in the tape alphabet), in such away that symbols which
are close to the head appear on the top of the terms. For instance a tape content abaabaab↑
is represented by the words b(a(a(b(a(0))))), a(a(b(0))). We use a binary tupling symbol
〈_, _, _〉 to put together the two components of the tape and the state. Now, for instance,
with each transition rule 〈q, a〉 → 〈q ′, b, left〉 we associate the constraint:
f 12=2121,131=213(〈q ′, X, b(Y )〉, Z ∩ f (〈q, a(X), Y 〉,)) ⊆ Z
X, Y being tape contents, the equality tests ensure that we keep the same remaining tape
contents when we move from one state to another.
The idea is that the least solution 0 of the constraint will assign to Z the (encoding of
the) set of computations of the Turing machine. Adding
Z ∩ f (〈qf ,,〉,) ⊆ X0
for the ﬁnal states and
〈q0, 0, 0〉 ⊆ Z
for the initial state, the emptiness of 0(X0) is equivalent to the halting problem (i.e. the
reachability of the state qf ). 
5.1.4. Basic variables and expressions
That is why we are going to put more restrictions on the constraints. The idea is to divide
the set variables into two sets: the basic and the nonbasic variables. The basic ones corre-
spond to sets of terms whose only a ﬁxed part can be seen. This corresponds to noninvertible
symbols in Section 2.2. We do not impose any restrictions on the equality tests for such
basic variables since, intuitively, the noninvertible symbols impose a boarder in the terms
under which no test takes place, hence limiting the overlaps of equalities which yield the
undecidability result.
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For nonbasic variables, we impose a restriction, which, roughly, allows to check the
equalities using one memory only. The goal is of course to use the results of Section 4.
If X is a variable of a constraint S, then letR(X) be the set of atomic constraints whose
right hand side contains X.
We introduce now one-way function symbols of a constraint S. This notion is of course
related to the one-way function symbols of Section 2 (it is a generalization). Intuitively, a
symbol is one-way in a constraint S if, in each of its applications, there is no way to look at
the subterms. “Looking at the subterms” occur in two cases: when we apply a “projection”
(i.e. when there is an inclusion whose right member is headed with that symbol) and when
we check for equality of some subterms.
Deﬁnition 21. A function symbol g is one-way in a set constraint S if
• it does not occur on the right of an inclusion constraint of S
• in any expression e = f c(e1, . . . , en) occurring in S, for every  ∈ P(c) and for every
strict preﬁx ′ of , e|′ does not contain any expression headed with g.
Let OF(S) be the set of one-way function symbols in S.
Deﬁnition 22. The basic variables of a set constraint  is the largest set of variables
occurring in  such that
• If X is basic thenR(X) only contains one-way symbols and basic variables.
• If X is basic then
◦ eitherR(X) contains only one clause and this clause has the form:⇒ e ⊆ X where
X does not occur in e.
◦ or for every function symbol f occurring inR(X), if f occurs in someR(Y ) then Y
is basic.
Intuitively, the function symbols used recursively to construct basic variables cannot be
used for nonbasic variables.
Example 23. The following example is inspired by examples from Section 2. Let Nat, A,
DA, HA, M, Key, In be set variables and  consist of:
0 ⊆ Nat succ(Nat) ⊆ Nat
da(Nat) ⊆ DA ha(Nat) ⊆ HA
DA ⊆ A HA ⊆ A
K(A,A) ⊆ Key shr(A) ⊆ M
A ⊆ M Key ⊆ M
〈M,M〉 ⊆ M {M}M ⊆ M
Intruder capabilities such as
〈In, In〉 ⊆ In {In}In ⊆ In
In ∩ 〈,〉 ⊆ 〈In, In〉 In ∩ {}In ⊆ {In}In
A ⊆ In shr(DA) ⊆ In
In ∩ 〈,,〉 ⊆ 〈In, In, In〉
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And protocol-speciﬁc constraints such as
〈A,A〉 ⊆ In
〈〉c({〈A,Key,M〉}shr(A) ∩ In, {m(A,A)}Key,M) ⊆ In
where c stands here for 121 = 211 ∧ 111 = 212 ∧ 112 = 22 ∧ 113 = 3. (We will see in
section 6.1 how to translate cryptographic protocol into set constraints and, in particular,
we will develop a full example). In this example, all function symbols are one-way, except
the tupling 〈_, _〉 and 〈_, _, _〉 and encryption {_}
_
, because of the intruder’s constraints.
Then In and M are not basic while all other variables are basic.
Remark. Conditional inverses of the form
f (u1, . . . , un) ∈ I, u1 ∈ I, . . . uk ∈ I (k〈n)⇒ uk+i ∈ I
can always be expressed using set constraints:
f (In, . . . , In,, . . . ,) ∩ In ⊆ f (In, . . . , In).
The public key example is also given in Fig. 10.
The notion of basicity is extended to expressions: an expression e is basic if
• e is a basic variable or
• e is an intersection e1 ∩ e2 and either e1 or e2 is basic
• e is an expression f (e1, . . . , en) (or f c(e1, . . . , en)) and e1, . . . , en are basic.
5.1.5. Our assumptions
Deﬁnition 24 (Basicity condition). An an equality test c in an expression f c(e1, . . . , en)
satisﬁes the basicity condition (w.r.t. a set of basic variables) if
p · i · q ∼c p′
i = j
p′prefp∀w, p · j · w ∼c p · i · q

⇒
There are positions p1, p2 such that
p1 ∼c p′, p2 ∼c p · j and
either e|p1 or e|p2
contains basic expressions only
where pref is the preﬁx ordering on positions.
Fig. 4. The basicity condition.
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An expression e satisﬁes the basicity condition (w.r.t. a set of basic variables) if for each
expression f c(e1, ..., en), the equality test c satisﬁes the basicity condition.
The situation is depicted in Fig. 4: one of the three terminal positions on the picture
should hold basic expressions only.
Example 25. Let us examine the last constraint which is displayed in Example 23.
〈〉c({〈A,Key,M〉}shr(A) ∩ In, {m(A,A)}Key,M) ⊆ In
where c stands for 121 = 211 ∧ 111 = 212 ∧ 112 = 22 ∧ 113 = 3. At positions
121,111, there is only one subexpression A, which is basic. At position 112, there is only
one subexpression: Key, which is also basic. Remain the positions 3, 113, which do not
hold basic expressions.
In the deﬁnition, p′ can only be 3 and p ∈ {1, 11}. The basicity condition reduces to
check that subexpressions at positions 12, 111, 113 are basic, which is the case here.
Note that, if there are only two occurrences of non-basic variables in the expression, then
the basicity condition is always satisﬁed.
The basicity condition looks a bit complicated, but let us give more intuition.
From tree automaton point of view, while computing on the trees bottom-up, we want to
be able to check the equalities without carrying more than one memory at each node. The
difﬁculty is that we need the stability under intersection of this property.
Consider for instance the following constraints:
f 12=2(X ∩ f (X, Y ), Y ) ⊆ Y
f 11=2(Y ∩ f (X, Y ),X) ⊆ X.
Only one memory is sufﬁcient to recognize the instances of any of the two constraints.
Putting them together, however, we can derive
f 12=2(f 11=2(Y ∩ f (X, Y ),X) ∩ f (X, Y ), Y ) ⊆ Y.
Now, we need 2 memories to accept the instances of the left hand side since, when reaching
X we must keep this term in the memory (it is checked for equality higher up) and we must
also keep in the memory f (X, Y ), which is also checked for equality higher up. Note that
here X, Y are not basic since f is not a one-way function symbol.
Actually, a more natural, weaker, condition would be to assume that, in any c, if p, q
are in two different equivalence classes, then they do not share any preﬁx. Imposing such a
condition only yields an undecidable class of constraints.
On the other hand, if we intersect a basic expression with any expression, the result is a
basic expression. Hence, the basicity condition expresses roughly that on the sides of a path
checked for equality, we only ﬁnd basic expressions, freeing us from keeping additional
information when we intersect with another expression.
The basicity condition is also relevant for our application, as we will see.
The constraints satisfying the basicity condition are called set constraints with equality
tests (ET-constraints for short). Let us summarize:
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Deﬁnition 26. An ET-constraint is a ﬁnite conjunction of clauses
⇒ e ⊆ e′
in which e, e′ are set expressions built using
• Set variables.
• The constant symbol ⊥.
• Intersection.
• Function symbol application f c(. . .) or f (. . .).
We assume:
• That right hand sides (the expression e′ above) do not make use of the constructions
f c with a nonempty c.
• For every construction f c(e1, . . . , en), P(c) ⊆ (f c(e1, . . . , en)).
• The basicity condition.
ET-constraints contain properly intersection constraints since we can construct an ET-
constraint whose least solution is the set of trees  = {f (t, t) | t ∈ T (F)}. The only other
decidable set constraint formalism which allows to express  is the class deﬁned in [6],
in which, however, equality tests are restricted to brother positions (which is not the case
here). On the other hand, we have restrictions which are not present in [6].
5.2. Saturation
Weuse here a ﬁxed point computationmethodwhich is similar to the one in [7]: the goal is
to deduce enough consequences so that the inclusions whose right hand side is not a variable
become redundant, hence can be discarded. Unfortunately, the ﬁrst step (representation) in
[7] cannot be used in the same way here, since it does not preserve the class of constraints
we consider.
First, we prepare the saturation in Sections 5.2.1 –5.2.5, reducing ET-constraints to SET-
constraints. Then we design deduction rules (generalizing the rules of [7]), which preserve
SET-constraints (Lemma 47), are terminating (Lemma 49) and which yield to a saturated
system: the solved part of a saturated constraint S is satisﬁable if and only if S is satisﬁable
(Theorem 50).
The preparation steps consist in:
• normalizing the set expressions (Section 5.2.1): in particular, the subexpression at position
p of a normal expression is uniquely deﬁned (Lemma 29),
• ﬂattening the set expressions: we only keep paths which checked by an equality constraint
(Section 5.2.2),
• getting ride of basic variables (Section 5.2.3):we show that the constraintS is equivalent to
ﬁnitely many instances of S, in which basic variables are replaced by ground expressions
(Lemma 39),
• simplifying again the expressions, taking advantage of the previous steps (section 5.2.5).
We start with some simpliﬁcations of the constraints.
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Fig. 5. The properties 2 and 6.
5.2.1. Normalization
For every expression e, let us deﬁne two notions of size:
• |e|F is the cardinal of
⋃
p∈(e)e|p. This is proportional to the memory size, which is
required to store the expression, regardless to the equality tests.
• |e|t is the sum, for every expression f c(e1, . . . , en) ∈ ⋃p∈(e)e|p of the size of c. The
size of an individual test c is the sum of sizes of positions checked by c.
The goal of the ﬁrst transformation step (Normalization) is to reduce the expression to a
normal form.
Deﬁnition 27. An expression e is normal if the following conditions are satisﬁed for e:
1. All subexpressions of e satisfy the basicity condition.
2. If f c(e1, . . . , en)∩ e′ ∈ e|p0 , p ∼c q and p ·p1 ∼c q1 for a nontrivial p1, then e|p0·p·p1
is a basic expression(“For ancestor positions, the lowest one is basic”).
3. For every p ∈ (e), if gc(e1, . . . , en) ∩ e′ ∈ e|p, then, for every p1 ∼c p2, the
subexpressions at positions p1 and p2 in gc(e1, . . . , en) are identical.
4. for every equality test c occurring in e, every equivalence class of c contains at least two
positions which do not share any nontrivial preﬁx.
5. For everyp ∈ (e), e|p is either an intersection of variables or an intersectiongc(e1, . . . ,
en) ∩X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xm, in which case, for every p ∈ (e), e|p is a singleton.
6. If f c(e1, . . . , en) ∩ e′ ∈ e|p0 , p · p1 ∼c q for non-empty p, p1, gc′(e′1, . . . , e′m) ∩ e′′ ∈
e|p0·p, then either e|p0·p·p1 is a basic expression, or else for every p′ ∼c′ q ′, e|p0·p·p′ is
a basic expression (“For overlapping tests, the lowest one is basic”).
Conditions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed initially. Actually, even a property stronger than
condition 2 is initially satisﬁed since, so far, any two distinct positions in P(c) are in-
comparable w.r.t. the preﬁx ordering. We need however this weaker property to keep it
invariant.
Properties 2, 6 are illustrated in Fig. 5.
The main result of this section, whose proof is quite long and technical and is given in
Appendix A is the following:
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Lemma 28. Every expression e which satisﬁes the basicity condition can be transformed
into a normal expression e′ such that, for every , [[e]] = [[e′]].
We also conjecture that the transformation, as described in the appendix, yields an ex-
pression e′ such that |e′|F and |e′|t are polynomially bounded by |e|t and |e|F .
As a side consequence, the subexpression at a given position is now deﬁned in a unique
way:
Lemma 29. If e is an expression satisfying condition 5, then for every p ∈ (e), e|p is a
singleton.
Proof. We prove that e|p is a singleton for every p ∈ (e) by induction on e. If e is a
variable or a constant, then e|p is a singleton consisting in e itself.
Now, assuming e satisﬁes condition 5, e is either an intersection of variables or an
expression f c(e1, . . . , en) ∩ X1, . . . ∩ Xn. In the ﬁrst case (e) = {} and e|p = {e}
by deﬁnition. In the latter case, if p = i · p′, then e|p = ei |p′ ∪ X1|i·p′ . . . = ei |p′ by
deﬁnition. And, by induction hypothesis, ei |p′ is a singleton. 
So, now, we can use the terminology “the subexpression at positionp”, as well as replace-
ment at position p: C[e]p means either (this will be unambiguous from the context) that e
occurs at position p in the expression C[e]p or that we have replaced the subexpression at
position p with e.
The normalization is extended to constraints: every expression occurring in the constraint
can be assumed normal thanks to Lemma 28.
5.2.2. Abstractions
We abstract out subexpressions introducing new variables, as long as this preserves the
form of the constraints. For instance, for contexts C[ ]p, an inclusion e ⊆ C[f (e′)]p
becomes C[X]p ⊆ e, f (e′) ⊆ X where X is a new variable. This results in an equivalent
constraint (on the original variables) in which the inclusions are e ⊆ e′ where e′ is either
an intersection of variables X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xn or an expression f (X1, . . . , Xn).
More formally, we use the following rules, assuming that n2 and p is not the root
position:
(A1) ⇒ f c(e) ∩ e1 ⊆ e′ → (∃X)f c(e) ⊆ X,⇒ X ∩ e1 ⊆ e′,
(A2) ⇒ e ⊆ C[f (e′)]p → (∃X)⇒ e ⊆ C[X]p, f (e′) ⊆ X,
X ⊆ f (e′),
(A3) ⇒ e ⊆ C[e1 ∩ . . . ∩ en]p → (∃X)⇒ e ⊆ C[X]p, e1 ∩ . . . ∩ en ⊆ X.
In these rules, X is a new variable: we assume that there is no capture. The following
lemma is a consequence of the deﬁnitions:
Lemma 30. Applying abstraction does terminate on any constraint S, resulting in a con-
straint S′ such that the solutions of S are the restrictions of solutions of S′ to the free
variables of S. Moreover, if S is an ET-constraint, then so is S′ and if every expression is
normal in S, then every expression is normal in S′.
170 H. Comon, V. Cortier / Theoretical Computer Science 331 (2005) 143–214
We can also abstract out in the conditions of the inclusions. However, using such a rule
in an unrestricted way would lead to non termination of the saturation. That is why we are
going to use it only once, to simplify the original constraint and forget it afterwards:
(A4) nonempty(e),⇒ e1 ⊆ e2
→ (∃Y )e ⊆ Y ∧ nonempty(Y ),⇒ e1 ⊆ e2.
In this rule, e is assumed not to be a variable. It is also assumed that there is no capture
(Y is a new variable).
Lemma 31. (A4) preserves the solutions of the constraint.
Proof. Assume S → S′ using the rule (A4). If  is a solution of S, extending  with
Y !→ [[e]] yields a solution of S′.
Conversely, if ′ is a solution of S′, then its restriction  to variables other than Y is a
solution of S: either    nonempty(e),, in which case  satisﬁes nonempty(e), ⇒
e1 ⊆ e2, or else [[e]] is non-empty. In the latter case, [[Y ]]′ is nonempty (because of the
constraint e ⊆ Y ) and [[e1]] = [[e1]]′ ⊆ [[e2]]′ = [[e2]]. 
Inspecting the normal forms w.r.t. (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4), together with our hypotheses,
the atomic constraints are now of the form  ⇒ e ⊆ e′ where  is a conjunction of
nonempty(X), e′ is of the form f (X1, . . . , Xn) orX1∩. . .∩Xn and e is eitherX1∩. . .∩Xn
or f c(e).
5.2.3. Getting rid of basic variables
Next, we can get rid of basic type variables. The main idea is that we can replace each
basic variable with a suitably chosen ﬁnite set, while keeping the desirable properties. This
is described in the next lemmas.
We let B(S) be the set of basic variables of S. We split each ET-constraint into two parts
S = SB unionmultiSNB: SB is the union ofR(X) forX ∈ B(S) and SNB is the remaining constraint.
Remember that for any basic variable, either every function symbols ofR(X) occurs only
in SB (ﬁrst type) orR(X) contains only one clause on the form⇒ CX(X1, . . . , Xk) ⊆ X
where X is distinct from the Xi (second type). We ﬁrst get ride of the basic variables X of
second type by replacing them by the clause CX(X1, . . . , Xk).
Lemma 32. Given an ET-constraint S, let
S′def=S[X !→ CX(X1, . . . , Xk)]X of second type.
Then S′ is an ET-constraint and S is satisﬁable if and only if S′ is satisﬁable.
Proof. SinceCX(X1, . . . , Xk) contains only one-way function symbols and basic variables,
CX(X1, . . . , Xk) is a basic expression thus S′ is an ET-constraint.
If  is a solution of S′, then  extended to the basic variables of second type by (X) =
[[CX(X1, . . . , Xk)]] is clearly a solution of S.
Conversely, if S is satisﬁable, then S has a minimal solution . By minimality of , we
have necessarily [[X]] = [[CX(X1, . . . , Xk)]]. Thus  is solution of S′. 
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From now on, we consider only ET-constraints with only basic variables of second type.
In particular, the function symbols occurring in SB do not occur in SNB.
Example 33. We consider some of the constraints presented in Example 23.
SB


0 ⊆ Nat succ(Nat) ⊆ Nat
da(Nat) ⊆ DA ha(Nat) ⊆ HA
DA ⊆ A HA ⊆ A
K(A,A) ⊆ Key
SNB

 A ⊆ M Key ⊆ M〈M,M〉 ⊆ M {M}M ⊆ M
shr(A) ⊆ M
Then there is one basic variable of second type: Key. Thus we transform our ET-constraint
following Lemma 32:
SB

 0 ⊆ Nat succ(Nat) ⊆ Natda(Nat) ⊆ DA ha(Nat) ⊆ HA
DA ⊆ A HA ⊆ A
SNB

 A ⊆ M K(A,A) ⊆ M〈M,M〉 ⊆ M {M}M ⊆ M
shr(A) ⊆ M
Lemma 34. SB has a least solution m. It is possible to compute a ﬁnite tree automaton
Am, whose states are ﬁnite sets of variables in SB and such that m(X) is the set of trees
accepted in the state {X}.
Proof. Since one-way function symbols do not occur on the right of inclusions, in any
constraint  ⇒ e ⊆ e′, e′ is an intersection of variables. Then SB is satisﬁable: assign-
ing every variable to T (OF ) is a solution. Then, by Proposition 19 there is a minimal
solution m.
We can also easily construct the minimal solution in an effective way, applying e.g. the
saturation rules of Fig. 2 to this particular case: because there are only one-way functions
in SB , there is no construction f c(. . .) here. The saturated constraint coincides here with
the solved form (since there are no function symbols on the right).
As in Section 3.2, the solved form corresponds to a tree automaton Am whose states are
set variables. 
Let ≈ be any equivalence relation on T (OF ). ≈ is extended to the least congruence
relation on T (F ), which we write again ≈. Then, every assignment  from the set of
variables to 2T (F ) is extended into the assignment ≈ deﬁned by:
≈(X)
def= {t ∈ T (F ) | ∃u ∈ T (F ), t ≈ u, u ∈ (X)}.
in other words,  is saturated by ≈.
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Lemma 35. For every equivalence relation ≈ on T (OF ), if  is a solution of an ET-
constraint S, in normal form w.r.t. Norm, (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4), then ≈ is a solution
of S.
Proof. Assume ⇒ e ⊆ e′ ∈ S. Since  only consists of formulas nonempty(X) where
X is a variable,  if and only if ≈.
Let t ∈ [[e]] and u ≈ t .
We prove, by induction on the size of e′ that
t ∈ [[e′]] ⇒ u ∈ [[e′]]≈ .
• If e′ is a variable, the implication follows from the congruence property of ≈.
• If e′ = e1 ∩ e2, this is straightforward.
• If e′ = f (e1, . . . , en) then f /∈ OF (by deﬁnition of one-way symbols). From t ∈ [[e′]],
it follows that t = f (t1, . . . , tn). Then u = f (u1, . . . , un) with ti ≈ ui for every i,
since f /∈ OF(S). By induction hypothesis, for every i, ti ∈ [[ei]], hence ui ∈ [[ei]]≈ ,
therefore u ∈ [[e′]]≈ . 
Now, the idea is to construct a ﬁnite index relation≈ such that we may interpret the basic
variables in a set of representatives modulo ≈.
Lemma 36. There is a congruence≈ and an assignment 0 to the variables of S such that
0≈ = m and 0(X) is ﬁnite for every variable X.
Proof. We use the automaton describing m and we consider ≈ deﬁned by t ≈ u iff t and
u are accepted in exactly the same states of the automaton. Let R be a set of representatives
for≈ such that if f (t1, . . . , tn) is in R then, t1, . . . , tn are also in R. 0 assigns R ∩ [[X]]m
to X. 
Remark.Note that every element ofR is recognized by at least one stateX of the automaton.
Example 37. We consider again the constraints presented in Example 33. The automaton
Am associated with SB is the following one:
0 → qNat succ(qNat) → qNat
da(qNat) → qDA ha(qNat) → qHA
qDA → qA qHA → qA
Thus the equivalence classes are:
{succn(0)|n ∈ N}, {da(succn(0))|n ∈ N}, {ha(succn(0))|n ∈ N}
We choose R = {0, ha(0), da(0)} and 0(Nat) = {0}, 0(HA) = {ha(0)}, 0(DA) =
{da(0)}, 0(Agent) = {ha(0), da(0)}.
If  is an assignment of basic set variables to ﬁnite set of terms in T (OF ), then (SNB)
is the set constraint obtained, replacing each basic variable X with
⋃
t∈(X)t . Since basic
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variables do not occur on the right hand sides of inclusions in SNB,(SNB) can be normalized
in anET-constraint, removing unions occurring on the left or in the conditions by duplicating
the constraints.
Example 38. In our example 37, 0(SNB) is equal to:
ha(0) ⊆ M da(0) ⊆ M
K(ha(0), ha(0)) ⊆ M K(ha(0), da(0)) ⊆ M
K(da(0), ha(0)) ⊆ M K(da(0), da(0)) ⊆ M
〈M,M〉 ⊆ M {M}M ⊆ M
shr(ha(0)) ⊆ M shr(da(0)) ⊆ M
Lemma 39. Let 0 be the restriction to basic variables of the assignment deﬁned as in
Lemma 36. Let ≈ be the congruence as deﬁned in Lemma 36. Then S is satisﬁable iff
0(SNB ∪ SOF) is satisﬁable.
Proof. First assume that S is satisﬁable and  is a solution of S. Thanks to Lemma 35, we
can assume w.l.o.g. that  = ≈. Let us construct ′ such that ′≈ =  and ′ is a solution
of 0(SNB).
For every term t ∈ T (F ), let t ↓ be its representative for ≈. We deﬁne
′(X) = {t ↓ | t ∈ (X)}.
Let us prove that ′ is a solution of 0(SNB). Let  ⇒ e ⊆ e′ in SNB. If ′    then ′
satisﬁes the clause. Otherwise,  and therefore [[e]] ⊆ [[e′]]. Let t ∈ [[e]] (and hence
t ∈ [[e′]]). We want to prove that t ↓∈ [[e′]]′ . By abstraction, e′ is either an intersection of
variables or an expression f (X1, . . . , Xn). In the ﬁrst case, t ∈ [[e′]] implies, by deﬁnition
of ′, t ↓∈ [[e′]]′ . In the second case, f /∈ OF , by deﬁnition of one-way function symbols.
Then t ∈ [[e′]] implies that t = f (t1, . . . , tn) and t ↓= f (t1 ↓, . . . , tn ↓). Then ti ∈ [[Xi]]
implies, by deﬁnition of ′, that ti ↓∈ [[Xi]]′ , hence t ∈ [[e′]]′ .
Conversely, assume that ′ is the minimal solution of 0(SNB). We extend ′ with 0
to basic variables. Let us prove that ′≈ is a solution of S. We ﬁrst need to establish some
properties on ′:
Lemma 40. If u ∈ [[X]]′ , then u = u ↓.
Proof. For every term t ∈ T (F ), let t ↓ be its representative for≈. t ↓= C[t1 ↓, . . . , tn ↓]
for some contextC, such that t = C[t1, . . . , tn] and for every termu ≈ t ,u = C[u1, . . . , un]
with ti ≈ ui . The maximal context C verifying the property above is called the canonical
context of t . Note that since the ti ↓ are representatives of the minimal solution of SB ,
then the function symbols of the ti ↓ do not occur in SNB. In addition, the ti are equivalent
(modulo ≈) to the ti ↓, thus we have also that the function symbols of the ti do not occur
in SNB.
Let us ﬁrst prove by induction on e that:
for every , if for every term t and every set variable X, t ∈ [[X]] implies t = t ↓,
then for every expression e occurring in 0(SNB), t ∈ [[e]] implies t = t ↓.
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Indeed, assume that for every term t and every set variable X, t ∈ [[X]] implies t = t ↓
and consider e occurring in 0(SNB) and u ∈ [[e]], u = C[u1, . . . , un] where C is the
canonical context of u. For every i, let us split up both e and C:
• either there exists pi and CiC such that Ci[ui] ∈ [[e|pi ]] and e|pi = e′′ ∩ Y . In
particular, Ci[ui] ∈ [[Y ]], thus by hypothesis, Ci[ui] = Ci[ui] ↓. By construction of
the context, Ci[ui] ↓= Ci[ui ↓] thus ui = ui ↓.
• or there exists pi such that ui ∈ [[e|pi ]]. Since e = 0(e1) for some e1 occurring in SNB,
we have to consider again two cases:
◦ either pi is not a path in e1, i.e., there exists qi〈pi such that e1|qi = X where X is a
basic variable and e|qi ∈ 0(X). Thus u|qi ∈ 0(X) ⊆ R and u|qi = Ci[ui]. Since
u|qi ∈ R, Ci[ui] = Ci[ui] ↓= Ci[ui ↓], thus ui = ui ↓.
◦ either pi is a path in e1: Since the function symbols of ui do not occur in SNB and
ui ∈ [[e|pi ]], e1|pi is necessarily an intersection of variables: e1|pi = X1 ∩ . . .∩Xn.
If one of the variable, say X1, is basic then 0(e1) ∈ 0(X) and we conclude like
above. Else ui ∈ [[X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xn]] and we conclude by hypothesis.
We are now ready to end the proof of Lemma 40 by induction on the ﬁxed point of our
deduction system: assume that for every n′〈n, then u ∈ [[X]]
T n
′
(∅) implies u = u ↓. and
let us show that u ∈ [[X]]T n(∅) implies u = u ↓. Let ⇒ e ⊆ e′ ∈ 0(SNB) be the clause
which generated u (we assume w.l.o.g. that e′ does not contain intersection symbols like in
Section 5.1.2):
if e′ = X then u ∈ [[e]]T n−1(∅) and we conclude by induction.
if e′ = f (X1, . . . , Xn) and X = Xi then there exists v ∈ [[e]]T n−1(∅) such that v = f (. . . ,
u, . . .). Since f does not occurs in R(X) for X basic variable, v can not be accepted
in any state X where is a basic variable, thus v ↓= f (. . . , u ↓, . . .). By induction
and the property we have just demonstrated, we know that v = v ↓ which implies
u = u ↓. 
We are now ready to prove Lemma 39. ′≈ is a solution of SB , by deﬁnition of ≈ and ′.
Let us consider a clause ⇒ e ⊆ e′, which does not belong to SB . Since  only contains
atomic formulas of the form nonempty(X), ′ iff ′≈. Assume that ′ (if it is not
the case, then ′≈ trivially satisﬁes the clause).
By induction on e, any term t ∈ [[e]]′≈ is equivalent, modulo≈ to a term u ∈ [[e]]′ such
that u ∈ [[e′]]′ . Indeed, if e is a variable, this is true by deﬁnition of ≈. If e = e1 ∩ e2,
then, by induction, there exists u1 ∈ [[e1]]′ and u2 ∈ [[e2]]′ such that t ≈ u1 and t ≈ u2.
By Lemma 40, u1 = u1 ↓, u2 = u2 ↓, thus u1 = u2 and u1 ∈ [[e]]′ . If e = f (e1, . . . , en)
(last case), then t = f (t1, . . . , tn), ti ∈ [[ei]]′≈ . By induction, there exists ui ≈ ti such that
ui ∈ [[ei]]′ , thus udef=f (u1, . . . , un) ∈ [[e]]′ and u ≈ t .
Now, either e′ is the intersection of the variablesXi , inwhich case there existsui ∈ [[Xi]]′
for every i such that ui ≈ t , hence t ∈ [[Xi]]′≈ for every i, or else e′ = f (X1, . . . , Xn). In
the latter case, f /∈ OF and therefore t = f (t1, . . . , tn), u = f (u1, . . . , un) with ti ≈ ui
and ui ∈ [[Xi]]′ . Again, this implies that ti ∈ [[Xi]]′≈ for every i, hence t ∈ [[e′]]′≈ . 
Thanks to Lemma 39, and as far as satisﬁability is concerned, we can now restrict our
attention to the constraint 0(SNB) in which there is no longer any basic
variable.
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From the cryptographic protocols point of view, if we assume that the set of principal
names correspond in the set constraint formalism to a basic variable N (which is the case
in all formalism we know), Lemma 39 shows that, if there is an attack, then there is an
attack with a bounded number of principals. The bound is given by the cardinal of 0(N).
Again, in any description of principals that we can think of, 0(N) will contain at most two
elements. Then, the result shows that, if there is an attack, then there is an attack involving
two distinct principals only (a honest one and a dishonest one).
5.2.4. Complexity issues in eliminating the basic variables
Before going any further, let us comment on the complexity of 0(SNB)with respect to S.
First consider the computation of m. Following Theorem 11, the computation of Am
requires deterministic exponential time in general, since it is quite easy to encode the
emptiness problem for the intersection of tree automata [28].
On the other hand, we want to point out a particular case which can be relevant to the
application to cryptographic protocols. SB often satisﬁes additional properties, which we
describe below.
For every basic variable X, let Head(X) be the least set of (one-way) function symbols
such that
• if f (...) ⊆ X is an inclusion ofR(X), then f ∈ Head(X)
• if X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xn ⊆ X ∈ R(X), then Head(X1) ∩ . . . ∩ Head(Xn) ⊆ Head(X)
Lemma 41. If for every two basic variables X, Y , either X ⊆ Y ∈ SB or Y ⊆ X ∈
SB or Head(X) ∩ Head(Y ) = ∅, then it is possible to compute in polynomial time a
ﬁnite tree automaton whose states contain the basic variables and which accepts m(X) in
state X.
Proof. We can compute Head(X) in polynomial time. Then, while saturating SB , we
replace every intersection with either ∅ or the largest variable, preventing the combinatorial
explosion. 
A second source of complexity comes from the computation of an ET-constraint out
of 0(SNB): eliminating the disjunctions may lead to an exponential blow-up in general.
However, with the same hypothesis as above, the cardinal of 0(X) is smaller or equal to the
number of inclusions of the form Y ⊆ X. In particular, in our running example, only 0(A)
contains more than one element: 0(A) = {ha(0), da(0)}. In addition, if we assume that
there is no inclusion between basic variables as it was the case in our previous version [10],
then 0(X) assigns each basic variable either the empty set of a singleton set and therefore
0(SNB) is smaller in size than S itself.
5.2.5. Simplifying again the expressions
The goal of this section is to achieve further simpliﬁcations. In particular we show that,
after eliminating the basic variables, we can get rid of nested constructions f c(. . .).
Thanks to Lemma 39, we can now restrict our attention to the constraint 0(SNB). In such
a constraint, there is no longer any basic variable, which allows for several simpliﬁcations.
First, we can abstract one the left side of inclusions such that the inclusions are e ⊆ e′ where
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Simpliﬁcation
(N8) t ∩ e1 → ⊥
If t is ground
and(e1) ⊆ (t)
(N9) ⇒ e[t ∩ e0]p ⊆ e′ → (∃Y ) , nonempty(Y )⇒ e[t]p ⊆ e′,
t ∩ e0 ⊆ Y
If t is ground
and(e0) ⊆ (t)
(N10) f p=q∧c(e) → f c(e)
If f c(e)|p = f c(e)|q are ground
(N11) ⇒ e[f c∧p=q (e)]p ⊆ e′ → true
If t ∈ f c∧p=q (e)|p·p1 is ground,
u ∈ f c∧p=q (e)|q·p1 is ground
for some p1 and t = u
Fig. 6. Simpliﬁcation rules.
e is either an intersection of variables or an expression f c(e) in which, at any position which
is not a strict preﬁx of a position checked by c, there is a variable.
Formally, we use the following rules, assuming that n2 and p is not the root position:
and that p is not a strict preﬁx of any path checked (higher) in C:
(A4) ⇒ C[f c(e)]p ⊆ e′ → (∃X)⇒ C[X]p ⊆ e′, f c(e) ⊆ X
(A5) ⇒ C[e1 ∩ . . . ∩ en]p ⊆ e′ → (∃X)⇒ C[X]p ⊆ e′, e1 ∩ . . . ∩ en ⊆ X
In these rules, X is a new variable: we assume that there is no capture. The following
lemma is a consequence of the deﬁnitions:
Lemma 42. Applying abstraction does terminate on any constraint S, resulting in a con-
straint S′ such that the solutions of S are the restrictions of solutions of S′ to the free
variables of S. Moreover, if S is an ET-constraint, then so is S′ and if every expression is
normal in S, then every expression is normal in S′.
In addition, in the equality tests, if f c∧p=q(e) is an expression such that the subexpression
at position p (or q) is basic then the expressions at positions p, q must contain the same
ground term. This is also sufﬁcient: the equality test p = q can then be removed if the
appropriate inclusions t ⊆ X (t is ground) are added. Formally, we use the rules displayed
in Fig. 6.
Lemma 43. The simpliﬁcation rules displayed in Fig. 6 are terminating. If S is an ET-
constraint in which all expressions are normal, then the result S′ of simplifying and ab-
stracting 0(SNB) is an ET-constraint in which all expressions are normal and which is
satisﬁable iff S is satisﬁable. Moreover, in any expression f c(e1, . . . , en) occurring in S′,
e1, . . . , en do not contain a construction gc
′
(. . .).
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Proof. The correctness of the rules is a routine veriﬁcation. let us only consider the rule
(N9). If    , it sufﬁces to assign T (F ) to Y and both sides are satisﬁed by . If   
and [[e[t ∩ e0]]] ⊆ [[e′]], then extending  with Y !→ [[t ∩ e0]] we get a solution of the
right hand side:
• either [[t ∩ e0]] = ∅ and this is straightforward,
• or else [[t ∩ e0]] = {t}, since t is a ground term, in which case [[e[t ∩ e0]]] = [[e[t]]].
Conversely, if  is a solution of the right hand side, either [[Y ]] is empty, which means
that t /∈ [[e0]] and the left hand side is satisﬁed by  or [[Y ]] = {t}, in which case
[[e[t ∩ e0]]] = [[e[t]]] ⊆ [[e′]].
Thanks to Lemma 39, it only remains to show that all expressions are normal in S′
whenever all expressions are normal in S and that, moreover, there is no longer any nested
equality test.
For every expression f c(e), P(c) ⊆ (f c(e)). Only the case of (N9) is not trivial. The
property is ensured by the side condition.
Condition 5 is satisﬁed. 0 may replace variables with ground terms, hence replace ex-
pressions gc(e) ∩ X1 ∩ . . . Xn with gc(e) ∩ t1 ∩ . . . ∩ tn. However, each ti is either a
variable or is ground. If at least one of them is ground, we can apply either (N8) or (N9).
Condition 3 is satisﬁed. There are two situations in which property 3 is not trivially pre-
served: ﬁrst when, while removing disjunctions in 0(SNB), we do not keep the consis-
tency with equality tests: in an expression f p=q∧c(e), X has been replaced with t at a
position p · p1, while X has been replaced with u at the position q · p1. This case is
handled by rule (N11).
The second situation in which condition 3 may not be preserved is when we apply the
rule (N9). However, in this case, applying the rule to all identical expressions restores
condition 3.
Condition 1 is satisﬁed. Thanks to (N10) and (N11), we cannot have p ∼c q, e|p ground
and e|q not ground. So, a repeated application of (N10) consists in removing an equiva-
lence class, which preserves condition 1, thanks to lemma 72. The rules other than (N10)
trivially preserve condition 1.
Conditions 4, 2 and 6 are satisﬁed. Again, the only rule to be considered is (N10) since
this is the only rule in the set which modiﬁes the tests without removing them entirely.As
above, since its repeated application removes a class, properties 4, 2 and 6 are preserved.
There is no nested test. Assume that there are nested tests: f c(e)|p = gc′(e′) ∩ e′′.
First, if there are p1 ∼c p2 such that p is a preﬁx of p1, by properties 6 and 1, for every
p′ ∼c′ q ′, gc′(e′)|p′ must be a basic expression, hence a ground term. Then, the rules
(N8), (N9), (N10), (N11) ensure that c′ is empty.
On the other hand, if this is not the case and if there are p1 ∼c p2 such that p1 shares a
non-trivial preﬁx with p, then, by property 1, f c(e)|p must be a basic expression, hence
a ground term. In this last case c′ must be empty again.
Remains only the case in which, for every p1 ∼c p2, p1 is either incomparable with p or
a preﬁx of p. Then,Abstract can be applied, which contradicts the hypothesis on SNB.

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We use a ﬁnal simpliﬁcation rule, abstracting away some more expressions:
(N12)⇒ e[X ∩ g(e′1, . . . , e′m)]p ⊆ e′ → (∃Y1, . . . , Ym)
X ∩ g(, . . . ,) ⊆ g(Y1, . . . , Ym)
⇒ e[g(Y1 ∩ e′1, . . . , Ym ∩ e′m)]p ⊆ e′
If p is nonempty.
The rule assumes that there is a variablewhich captures all terms (this is easy to deﬁne).
The correctness of the rule as well as the preservation of all properties is quite straight-
forward. Let us now inspect the constraints we have still to consider.
Deﬁnition 44. The SET-constraints (simpliﬁed equality tests constraints) are a subclass of
ET-constraints in which, for every clause
nonempty(e′1), . . . , nonempty(e′m)⇒ e ⊆ e′
(resp. nonempty(e′1), . . . , nonempty(e′m)⇒ false).
1. each of e, e′1, . . . , e′m is either an intersection of variables or an expressionf c(e1, . . . , en)
such that e1, . . . , en do not contain any equality tests nor expressions X ∩ g(. . .).
2. For every p ∈ (e), except the root, either p is a strict preﬁx of some q ∈ P(c), or else
e|p is a (basic) ground term or p ∈ P(c) and e|p is an intersection of variables.
3. If p ∼c q, e|p = e|q .
4. e′ is either a variable or an expression f ′(X1, . . . , Xn) whereX1, . . . , Xn are variables.
Lemma 45. The simpliﬁcation rules displayed in Fig. 6 are terminating. If S is a SET-
constraint in which all expressions are normal, then the result S′ of simplifying and ab-
stracting 0(SNB) is an ET-constraint
Proof. Let us show that S′ veriﬁes the four conditions of SET-constraints.
1. Assume e or one of the e′i is of the form f c(e1, . . . , en) and that one of the ej contains an
equality test cj . Then, by abstracting, it must be that c overlaps cj which is not possible
since S′ is normalized.
2. After abstraction, if p is not a strict preﬁx of some q ∈ P(c) and p is in (e), then
p ∈ P(c) and e|p is a variable. After simplifying, if p is not a strict preﬁx of some
q ∈ P(c), then e|p is either a variable or a ground term.
Conditions 3 and 4 are consequences of the deﬁnitions. 
5.2.6. Deduction rules
Now, we are ready to apply the deduction rules given in Fig. 7. c ↓i is deﬁned by
(c ∧ c′) ↓i def= c ↓i ∧c′ ↓i , (i · p = i · q) ↓i def= p = q and (j · p = q) ↓i def=  when i = j .
ec is the expression in which the top symbol of e is constrained by c. (It is used only in a
context where e must be headed with a function symbol or c = ). Finally, X denotes a
variable in these rules.
Lemma 46. The inference rules in Fig. 7 are correct: the new constraint is a consequence
of the previous ones.
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Transitivity
1 ⇒ e1 ⊆ X 2 ⇒ X ⊆ e2
1,2 ⇒ e1 ⊆ e2
Compatibility
⇒ X ∩ e1 ⊆ e′1 ′ ⇒ e2 ⊆ X
,′ ⇒ e1 ∩ e2 ⊆ e′1
If both e1 and e2 are intersections of variables
Clash
⇒ f (e) ⊆ g( e′)
⇒ false
if f = g
Projection
⇒ f c(e1, . . . , en) ⊆ f (e′1, . . . , e′n)
,nonempty(f c(e1, . . . , en))⇒ ec↓ii ⊆ e′i
Deduction
1 ⇒ f c1
(
e11, . . . , e
1
n
)
⊆ X1
.
.
.
k ⇒ f ck
(
ek1, . . . , e
k
n
)
⊆ Xk
⇒ X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xk ⊆ e
∃ X11, . . . Xn1 , . . . , X1k , . . . , Xnk .
⇒ f
(
X11 ∩ . . . ∩X1k , . . . , Xn1 ∩ . . . ∩Xnk
)
⊆ e
1 ⇒ f c1
(
e11, . . . , e
1
n
)
⊆ f
(
X11, . . . , X
1
n
)
.
.
.
k ⇒ f ck
(
ek1, . . . , e
k
n
)
⊆ f
(
Xk1, . . . , X
k
n
)
The clause ⇒ f (X11 ∩ . . . ∩ X1k , . . . , Xn1 ∩ . . . ∩ Xnk ) ⊆ e in the conclusion of Deduction is marked so
that it cannot be used as a premisse of Deduction. In addition, if 1 ⇒ e1 ⊆ X is a marked clause, then for
every clause 2 ⇒ X ⊆ e2, then clause 1,2 ⇒ e1 ⊆ e2 is also a marked clause.
Fig. 7. The saturation rules.
Proof. OnlyProjection andDeduction are not trivially correct. Let us startwithProjection.
We want to prove that, if  is a solution of ⇒ f c(e1, . . . , en) ⊆ f (e′1, . . . , e′n), then 
is a solution of , nonempty(f c(e1, . . . , en))⇒ ec↓ii ⊆ e′i .
Assume   , nonempty(f c(e1, . . . , en)). Then there is an u ∈ [[f c(e1, . . . , en)]] and
[[f c(e1, . . . , en)]] ⊆ [[f (e′1, . . . , e′n)]].
Let t ∈ [[ec↓ii ]]. We build v as follows: v is the term u in which• u|i is replaced with t ,
• for every i · p ∼c j · q with i = j , u|j ·q is replaced with t |p.
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Let us show that v ∈ [[f c(e1, . . . , en)]].
• First, v ∈ [[f (e1, . . . , en)]]: let v = f (v1, . . . , vn). vi = t ∈ [[ei]] and we prove by
induction on |c| that, for every i = j , vj ∈ [[ej ]].
• If c is empty, or if c does not contain any equation i ·p = j ·q, then vj = uj and therefore
vj ∈ [[ej ]].
• If i · p ∼c j · q, by induction hypothesis, wj = vj [u|j ·q ]q ∈ [[ej ]]. Moreover, by
property 3, ej |q = ei |p, hence t |p ∈ [[ej |q ]]. Now, since we assumed in the condition of
the projection rule, that there is no intersection symbol along the path j · q, vj ∈ [[ej ]].
• We have to prove now that v  c:
◦ For the tests i ·p = i ·q ∈ c, v  i ·p = i ·q follows from t  p = q (since t  c ↓ i).
◦ The tests i · p = j · q with i = j are satisﬁed by construction.
◦ For the tests j1 · p = j2 · q, either there is a r such that j1 · p ∼c i · r and we are
back to the previous case, or else u|j1·p = v|j1·p and u|j2·q = v|j2·q , which implies
v  j1 · p = j2 · q since u  j1 · p = j2 · q.
Now, v ∈ [[f c(e1, . . . , en)]] implies that v ∈ [[f (e′1, . . . , e′n)]], hence t ∈ [[e′i]].
Now consider Deduction. The rule is actually a combination of several rules which are
all correct: for every i, we introduce
(1) Xi ∩ f (, . . . ,) = f (Xi1, . . . , Xin).
Then, we may intersect both sides of X1 ∩ . . . ∩ Xk ⊆ e with f (, . . . ,) and use a
compatibility. We get
⇒ f (X11, . . . , X1n) ∩ . . . ∩ f (Xk1, . . . , Xkn) ⊆ e.
Normalizing the left hand side, we get the clause
⇒ f (X11 ∩ . . . ∩X1k , , . . . , Xn1 ∩ . . . ∩Xnk ) ⊆ e.
Now, for every i, from (1) and the inclusioni ⇒ f ci (ei1, . . . , ein) ⊆ Xi , intersecting again
both sides with f (, . . . ,), we deduce by transitivity and since f c(. . .) ⊆ f (, . . . ,):
i ⇒ f ci (ei1, . . . , ein) ⊆ f (Xi1, . . . , Xin) 
Lemma 47. Every transformation rule transforms a SET-constraint into a SET-constraint.
Proof. Only the projection rule has to be considered: we need to check that ec↓ii satisﬁes the
conditions of SET-constraints, which follows from the fact that p ∼c↓i q iff p · i ∼c q · i.

Now, we consider the termination problem. The main problem is to control the creation
of new variables.
Lemma 48. The number of variables created during the saturation procedure can be
bounded by |S|t × a.
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Proof. Only Deduction introduces new variables. It is simpler to see the Deduction rule
as a variable introduction (rule (1) in the proof of Lemma 46) combined with other de-
duction rules, which preserve the semantics and do not introduce variables. As far as vari-
ables creation is concerned, we can, w.l.o.g, assume that the conclusion of Deduction
are the clauses Xi ∩ f (, . . . ,) ⊆ f (Xi1, . . . , Xin). In particular, if the rule is applied
twice with the same variable Xi and the same function symbol f , we can use the same
variables Xij .
Themain problem is that these newvariablesXij may trigger again the introduction of new
variables. However, if we trace the origin of such variables, we observe that introducing the
Xij is subject to the presence of a constraint i ⇒ f ci (. . .) ⊆ Xi . Now, if later a constraint
′i ⇒ f c
′
i (. . .) ⊆ Xij triggers the introduction of new variables again, the expression
f c
′
i (. . .) must be the projection of some expression occurring at the previous level. And
since we can only perform a bounded number of projections on a given expression, we can
bound the number of successive variables generation. Let us formalize this.
Let us associate ﬁrst with each variable a level: the variables occurring in the original
constraint have level 0, and, each time we introduce new variables with:
(1) X ∩ f (, . . . ,) ⊆ f (X1, . . . , Xn)
the level of every variable Xi is one plus the level of X.
We prove, by induction on the levelm of a variableX, that, if (1) is applied toX, then there
is an expression e in the original set constraint and clauses ⇒ e′ ⊆ X′, 1 ⇒ X′ ⊆ X1,
…, n+1 ⇒ Xn ⊆ X such that e′ is obtained by at least m successive projections of e (we
say that e′ is a projection of e if e = f c(e1, . . . , en) and e′ = ec↓ii for some i).
When m = 0, observe that clauses  ⇒ f c(. . .) ⊆ X′ are either in the original set
constraint, or obtained by projection, or obtained by Transitivity or obtained by De-
duction itself. In case Transitivity has been applied, there exist another clause ′ ⇒
f c(. . .) ⊆ X′′ and a clause ′′ ⇒ X′′ ⊆ X′. Thus, by a simple induction, there exist a
clause ′ ⇒ f c(. . .) ⊆ X′′ and clauses 1 ⇒ X′′ ⊆ X1, …, n+1 ⇒ Xn ⊆ X′ such
that ′ ⇒ f c(. . .) ⊆ X′′ has been obtained by projection or by Deduction itself. How-
ever, in the latter case, we explicitly prevented using the resulting clause as a premisse of
Deduction.
When m > 0, observe that the variables Xij created by Deduction appear in only one
clause on the right of an inclusion: the clause i ⇒ f ci (ei1, . . . , ein) ⊆ f (Xi1, . . . , Xin).
OnlyProjection, applied to this clause,mayproduce a clause inwhichXij occurs on the right
of an inclusion: there exists a clause i ⇒ eij ci↓j ⊆ Xij such that eij ci↓j is the projection
of f ci (ei1, . . . , ein). Then we apply the induction hypothesis to i ⇒ f ci (ei1, . . . , ein) ⊆ Xi
since Xi is of level m− 1.
Now, howmany expressions f c(. . .) can be derived by projection from a given expression
? Note ﬁrst that no projection can be applied to a ground (basic) expression since one-way
symbols do not occur on the right of inclusions. Then, by deﬁnition of expressions occurring
in a SET-constraint, the number of expressions f c(. . .) which can be derived by projection
from an expression gc′(. . .) is the number of strict preﬁxes of positions in P(c′). It follows
that the number of new variables is bounded by |S|t × a. 
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Lemma 49. The rules of Fig. 7 are terminating: a ﬁxed point is reached after ﬁnitely many
steps (at most O (|S|a × 2(a+1)|S|) where a is the maximal arity of a function symbol and
|S| = |S|t + |S|F is the size of the original constraint.
Proof. We are going to show that only a ﬁnite number of distinct clauses can be generated
by the rules.
As we have seen in the proof of lemma 48, the number of distinct expressions f c(. . .)
occurring on the left of an inclusion is bounded by |S|t , plus the number of timesDeduction
is applied, which is itself bounded by |S|t × a thanks to Lemma 48. The other left sides
of inclusions are intersection of variables, hence there are at most 2a|S|t+|VS | such possible
left hand sides, thanks to Lemma 48.
The right sides of inclusions are variables or a function symbol applied to variables,
which gives a bound of a|S|t + |VS | + |F | × (a|S|t + |VS |)a .
Finally, we have to analyze the possible preconditions. They are conjunctions of
• nonempty(X) where X ∈ VS ,
• nonempty(f c(e1, . . . , en))where f c(e1, . . . , en) occurs as a left member of an inclusion
constraint.
Thanks to Lemma 48, this gives the following bound for the number of possible distinct
preconditions:
2|VS |+|S|t .
Now, putting everything together, at most(
(a + 1)× |S|t + 2a|S|t+|VS |
)
× (a|S|t + |VS | + |F | × (a|S|t + |VS |)a)
×2|VS |++|S|t
distinct clauses can be generated. Since |S|t + |VS | |S| and a|S|t + |VS |a× |S|, we get
the bound O
(|S|a × 2(a+1)|S|). 
If S is an ET-constraint, let solved(S) be the clauses  → a in S such that either a is
false or else a is an inclusion f c(e) ⊆ X where X is a variable.
As in [7], the following completeness result is obtained by inspecting each clause C ∈
S which is not in solved(S), showing that, thanks to saturatedness, the least solution of
solved(S) is a solution of C. There are only some additional cases for nonﬂat constraints
e.g. f c(X ∩ g(e), e′) ⊆ f ( e′′).
Theorem 50. If S is saturated, then either both S and solved(S) are unsatisﬁable or else
S has a least solution, which is the least solution of solved(S).
Proof. If solved(S) is unsatisﬁable, then S, which contains solved(S), is unsatisﬁable. Now,
assume solved(S) is satisﬁable and let  be its least solution. We show that  is a solution
of S.
We prove, by induction on n + size(t) that, for every clause  ⇒ e ⊆ e′ in S such that
  , and for every t ∈ [[e]]T nsolved(S)(∅) (which we abbreviate t ∈ [[e]]n), t ∈ [[e′]].
The result will follow, by minimality of .
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There are only three kinds of clauses  ⇒ e ⊆ e′, which are possibly in S and not in
solved(S). We study each of them (e′ is either a variable or an expression f (X1, . . . , Xn)).
⇒ X ⊆ g(Y1, . . . , Ym) , t ∈ [[X]]n, hence there is a clause ′ ⇒ e0 ⊆ X in solved(S)
such that   ′ and t ∈ [[e0]]n−1. By Transitivity, there is a clause ,′ ⇒ e0 ⊆
g(Y1, . . . , Ym) in S. Since   ,′ and t ∈ [[e0]]n−1, we apply the induction hypothesis
and get t ∈ [[g(Y1, . . . , Ym)]].
⇒ X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xp ⊆ e Weuse an induction on themultisetM(X1∩. . .∩Xp) def= {k1, . . . ,
kp} of integers ki such that t ∈ [[Xi]]ki and t /∈ [[Xi]]ki−1. The maximum of k1, . . . , kp
is, by hypothesis, smaller or equal to n. If it is strictly smaller than n, we use directly the
induction hypothesis. If this multiset is equal to {n}, then we are back to the ﬁrst case.
Hence, let us assume now that the multiset is strictly larger than {n}, which means in
particular that p2.
Since t ∈ [[Xi]]ki for every i, there are clausesi ⇒ ei0 ⊆ Xi in solved(S) such that  i
and t ∈ [[ei0]]ki−1. If one of the expressions ei0 is an intersection of variables, then by
Compatibility, there is a clause i ,′ ⇒ X1 ∩ . . .∩Xi−1 ∩ ei0 ∩Xi+1 ∩ . . .∩Xp ⊆ e
in S. Moreover,   ′ and t ∈ [[X1 ∩ . . . ∩ Xi−1 ∩ ei0 ∩ Xi+1 ∩ . . . ∩ Xp]]n. Finally,
M(X1∩ . . .∩Xi−1∩ei0∩Xi+1∩ . . .∩Xp) is obtained replacing ki inM(X1∩ . . . ,∩Xp)
with a multiset of strictly smaller numbers. Hence we get a strictly smaller multiset and
we may apply the induction hypothesis: t ∈ [[e]].
Now, if none of the expressions ei0 is an intersection of variables: t = f (t1, . . . , tn) and
ei0 = f ci (ei1, . . . , ein). If one of the clauses
i ⇒ f (ei1, . . . , ein) ⊆ Xi
is marked, then there exist a clause′i ⇒ f (ei1, . . . , ein) ⊆ X′i marked byDeduction and
clauses 1 ⇒ X′i ⊆ X1, …, n+1 ⇒ Xn ⊆ Xi such that i = ′i ,1, . . . ,n+1. Thus,
there is a clause′i ⇒ Z1∩ . . .∩Zm ⊆ X′i which triggered the application ofDeduction.
Then, applying repeatedly transitivity, there is a clause i ⇒ Z1 ∩ . . . ∩ Zm ⊆ Xi . In
such a case, for every k, eik = Z1k ∩ . . . ∩ Zmk . Now, t ∈ [[ei0]]ki−1, hence, for every k, j ,
tk ∈ [[Zjk ]]ki−1. It follows that, for every j , t ∈ [[Zj ]]ki−1. Now, by Compatibility, there
is a clause ,i ⇒ X1 ∩ . . . Z1 ∩ . . . ∩ Zm . . . ∩ Xn ⊆ e in S. And, as before, we get
an intersection of variables with a strictly smaller multiset. We conclude thanks to the
induction hypothesis.
Remains only the case where none of the clauses i ⇒ f (ei1, . . . , ein) ⊆ Xi is marked.
In this last case, we can apply Deduction. For every clause i ⇒ f ci (ei1, . . . , ein) ⊆
f (Xi1, . . . , X
i
n),   i and t ∈ [[f ci (ei1, . . . , ein)]]ki−1, hence tj ∈ [[Xij ]]ki for every i, j ,
by induction hypothesis.
If t is a constant, then ⇒ t ⊆ e is a clause of S and we can conclude.
Otherwise, if e is a variable, then
⇒ f (X11 ∩ . . . ∩X1p, . . . , Xn1 ∩ . . . ∩Xnp) ⊆ X
is a clause of solved(S). Hence t = f (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ [[X]]n+1.
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If e is not a variable, then e must be f (Y1, . . . , Yn) and, by Projection, for every j ,
, nonempty(f (X11 ∩ . . . ∩X1p, . . . , Xn1 ∩ . . . ∩Xnp))⇒ Xj1 ∩ . . . ∩Xjp ⊆ Yj
is a clause of S.  satisﬁes the premisse since t is a witness for the second part of the
precondition. Moreover, for every j , tj ∈ [[Xj1 ∩ . . . ∩ Xjp]]n and M(Xj1 ∩ . . . ∩ Xjp)
is smaller or equal toM(X1 ∩ . . . , Xp). Then, by induction hypothesis, tj ∈ [[Yj ]] for
every j . Hence t ∈ [[e]].
⇒ f c(e1, . . . , ep) ⊆ g(X1, . . . , Xm). If f = g, then, by Clash, the clause  ⇒ false
is in S, hence in solved(S), which contradicts   .
Assume now f = g. Then t = f (t1, . . . , tn). By Projection, there is a clause
Ci
def= , nonempty(f c(e1, . . . , ep))⇒ ec↓i ⊆ Xi
in S, for every i. Since t ∈ [[f c(e1, . . . , en)]],
  , nonempty(f c(e1, . . . , en)).
For every i, ti ∈ [[ei]]n since t ∈ [[f (e1, . . . , ep)]]n and ti  c ↓i since t  c (and by
deﬁnition of c ↓i). Thus ti ∈ [[ec↓ii ]]n which implies ti ∈ [[Xi]] by induction, thus
f (t1, . . . , tp) ∈ [[f (Y1, . . . , Yp)]]. 
We are now reduced to prove that the satisﬁability of solved(S) is decidable.
5.3. Connection with automata with one memory
Theorem 51. For every satisﬁable SET-constraint S, there is an (effectively computable)
alternating automaton with one memoryAS and an homomorphismH such thatAS accepts
t in the state X iff H(t) ∈ [[X]] where  is the least solution of solved(S).
Proof. The memory alphabet of the automaton is the set of function symbols used in the
constraint and the alphabet FAS is the memory alphabet with some additional symbols
allowing to check on auxiliary branches non-emptiness conditions. More precisely,
• the states of AS consist of
◦ the variables of S. We write them qX such states, for X a variable of S
◦ the states q for every = nonempty(e1), . . . , nonempty(em) such that nonempty
(e1), . . . , nonempty(em), nonempty(em+1), . . . , nonempty(en) is a precondition
of a clause in S.
◦ for every expression e = f c(e1, . . . , en) and for every nonleaf position p of such an
expression, a state qe,p
a state qa for every constant a ∈ F
• The memory alphabet is F
• The set of function symbols FAS consists in an auxiliary binary symbol E and, for every
symbol f ∈ F a symbol f+1 whose arity is one plus the arity of f .
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Let H be the homomorphism:
H(f (t1, . . . , tn))
def= f (H(t1), . . . , H(tn))
H(f+1(t0, t1, . . . , tn))
def= f (H(t1), . . . , H(tn))
H(E(t1, t2))
def= a
where a is any constant in F . (X) will be the image by H of the trees recognized in state
qX by AS .
By convention, if p is a leaf position of f c(e1, . . . , en), we let qe,p be the conjunction
qX1 ∧ . . . ∧ qXm if e|p = X1 ∩ . . . ∩Xm and qe,p = qa if e|p is the constant a.
The transition rules of AS consist of
1. a −→
a
qa .
2. f (qe,1, . . . , qe,n)
−−−−−−→

x1,...,xn.a
qf c(e1,...,en) for every literal nonempty(f c(e1, . . . , en))
occurring in S.  is the equality test c˜ deﬁned as follows: ˜i · p = j · q def= i = j and
c˜1 ∧ c2 def= c˜1 ∧ c˜2.
3. g(qe,p·1, . . . , qe,p·k)
c˜↓p−−→
F
qe,p in which e = f c(e1, . . . , en) occurs in S, p is a nonroot
position of e, e|p is headed with g. F = 
x1, . . . , xk.xi if p · i is a preﬁx of a position
in P(c). Note that if there are several such indices, Lemmas 28 and 43 imply that the
choice is irrelevant. c ↓ p is deﬁned as in the projection rule: c ↓  def= c, c1 ∧ c2 ↓
i · p def= (c1 ↓ i · p) ∧ (c2 ↓ i · p), (j · p1 = k · p2) ↓ i · p def=  if either i = j or k = i
and (i · p1 = i · p2) ↓ i · p def= (p1 = p2) ↓ p.
4. E(qe, qe′)
−−−−−→

x1,x2.x1
qnonempty(e),nonempty(e′) for every nonempty(e), nonempty
(e′) which is an initial sequence of a precondition of a clause of S.
5. E(q, qe)
−−−−−→

x1,x2.x1
q,nonempty(e) for every , nonempty(e) which is an initial se-
quence of a precondition of a clause of S.
6. f+1(q, qe,1, . . . , qe,n)
c˜−→
F
qX for every clause  ⇒ e ⊆ X in S such that e =
f c(e1, . . . , en). F = 
xi1 , . . . , xik .t where t is the expression e in which, at each e|j ·p
such that j · p ∈ P(c) is replaced with xij where ij = j ∈ c˜.
The following intermediate results are proved in Appendix B:
• If a term is accepted in state q where  is a precondition, then   .
• If   , then there is a term accepted in state q.
• If a term t is accepted in state qX, then H(t) ∈ (X).
• If t ∈ (X), then there exists t ′ is accepted in state qX such that H(t ′) = t .
From these lemmas, it follows that AS accepts the least solution  of solved(S) in the
sense that t is accepted in the state X iff H(t) ∈ [[X]]. 
Remark (W). e conjecture that the minimal solution of a SET-constraint is recognized by
an alternating tree automata with one memory. However, to prove this would require more
saturation rules to get rid of nonemptiness conditions (as in Section 3).
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As a consequence of Theorem 51 we get:
Theorem 52. The satisﬁability of ET-constraints is decidable.
Proof. As a consequence of Lemmas 46, 49, and Theorem 50, we can assume that S is a
solved form.
Then, consider all clauses ⇒ false in S and let S′ be the rest of S.
S′ is satisﬁable, then, thanks to Theorem 51, there is an automaton AS such that t is
accepted in qX iff H(t) ∈ [[X]] where  is the minimal solution of S′.
Let Qf be the set of states q such that  ⇒ false is in S. Then S is satisﬁable iff, the
automaton AS with ﬁnal states Qf does not accept any tree, which is decidable thanks to
Theorem 15. 
6. Analysis of cryptographic protocols
We present here a decidable fragment of the class of protocols described in Section 2.2
and we illustrate the relevance of this fragment by an example (inspired by Kerberos).
6.1. A decidable class of protocols
As we have seen in Section 2, the speciﬁcation of a protocol and its secrecy policy rely
not only on the rules of the protocol, but also on the signature. In particular, we must say
what are the expected types of each argument of a function symbol. This is far from being
innocent, since this corresponds to the ability of each agent to recognize different data types.
If all function symbols are assumed to take messages or agents as arguments and return
messages or agents, then the principals are assumed to distinguish only agents from other
messages. For instance, a pair of agents can be taken as a key in this case. Since many
attacks are due to type confusion [8], such a signature speciﬁcation would allow to detect
many more attacks. On the other hand, if typing information is available, then deciding
secrecy is easier.
One speciﬁcity of our model is that both the signature, hence the available type infor-
mation, and the protocol itself are parameters. The deﬁning conditions for our class will
therefore depend on both the signature and the protocol and be more restrictive when the
typing policy is more sloppy.
A rule of a protocol is of the form
{S(A, i,M),M1, . . . ,Mp} −→ {S(A, i + 1,M ′),M ′1, . . . ,M ′q},
whereMi are messages. As we have seen in Section 2, the secrecy for general protocols of
this form is undecidable. To obtain a decidable class, we consider protocols such that, for
each rule, the variables which are shared by M1, . . . ,Mp,M ′1, . . . ,M ′q satisfy a “basicity
condition”. Roughly, such a condition will state that only one variable may occur several
times in different contexts without being of basic type. For instance, if we do not assume
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any special ability of agents to recognize data types, then repeated variables occurring in
different contexts must be agents names, except for possibly one such variable.
In order to express our condition, let Xs be a variable for each sort s in the signature and
let Cmsg be the union of the deﬁnite set constraints
f (Xsort1 , . . . , Xsortn) ⊆ Xsort
for every function symbol f of type sort1 × · · · × sortn → sort, and the deﬁnite set
constraints
Xsort ⊆ Xsort′
if sort is a subsort of sort′. The basic sorts are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 22: this is the
largest set of sorts such that
• If s is basic thenR(Xs) only contains one-way symbols and basic sorts.
• If s is basic then
◦ eitherR(Xs) contains only one clause e ⊆ Xs such that Xs does not occur in e.
◦ or every function symbol occurring inR(Xs) occurs (possibly) only inR(Xs′)where
s′ is basic.
For instance, we have seen in Example 23 that, in our running example, all sorts are basic
except Message. Let Bmsg be the set of basic sorts.
Now, for each rule
rl = {S(A, i,M),M1, . . . ,Mp} −→ {S(A, i + 1,M ′),M ′1, . . . ,M ′q},
let trl
def=〈〈A,M〉,M1, . . . ,Mp, 〈A,M ′〉,M ′1, . . . ,M ′q〉 and for each variable Y , occurring in
rl, let Srl,Y
def= {p such that trl |p = Y }. Let crl,Y be the equality constraint p1 = . . . = p|k
for pj ∈ Srl,Y . In the particular case where Srl,Y is a singleton, crl,Y is the empty constraint.
Finally, let crl be the conjunction of the crl,Y for all variables Y occurring in rl.
Example 53. We describe here the trl and crl corresponding to our running example (see
Fig. 1, Example 5).
For the rule
∅−→


S(A, 1, 〈A,B, s〉),
S(B, 1, 〈B, s〉),
S(s, 1, s)


we get the term and constraints:
trl0
def= 〈〈A, 〈A,B, s〉〉, 〈B, 〈B, s〉〉, 〈s, s〉〉
crl0
def= 11 = 121 ∧ 122 = 21 = 221
For rule 1:
{S(A, 1, 〈A,B, s〉)} −→ {S(A, 2, 〈A,B, s〉), 〈A,B〉}
trl1
def= 〈〈A, 〈A,B, s〉〉, 〈A, 〈A,B, s〉〉, 〈A,B〉〉,
crl1
def= 11 = 121 = 212 = 221 ∧ 122 = 222
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For rule 2:{
S(s, 1, s)
〈A,B〉
}
−→
{
S(s, 2, s),
{B,K(A,B), {A,K(A,B)}shr(B)}shr(A)
}
trl2
def= 〈〈s, s〉, 〈A,B〉, 〈s, s〉,
〈{B, k1(A,B), {A, k1(A,B)}shr(B)}shr(A)〉〉
crl2
def= 21 = 4121 = 41311 = 413121 = 42 ∧ 22 = 411 = 4122
= 413122 = 4132
For rule 3:{
S(A, 2, 〈A,B, s〉),
{B,X, Y }shr(A)
}
−→
{
S(A, 3, 〈A,B, s,X,m(A,B)〉),
〈{m(A,B)}X, Y 〉
}
trl3
def= 〈〈A, 〈A,B, s〉〉, {B,X, Y }shr(A), (5)
〈A, 〈A,B, s,X, n1(A,B)〉〉, 〈{n1(A,B)}X, Y〉〉 (6)
crl3
def= 11 = 121 = 22 = 31 = 321 = 3251 = 4111 ∧ (7)
122 = 211 = 322 = 3252 = 4112 ∧ 212 = 324 = 412 ∧ 213 = 42.
(8)
For rule 4:{
S(B, 1, 〈B, s〉),
〈{Z}X, {A,X}shr(B)〉
}
−→
{ {S(B, 1, 〈B, s,A,Z,X〉),
{h(Z)}X}
}
trl4
def= 〈〈B, 〈B, s〉〉, 〈{Z}X, {A,X}shr(B)〉,
〈B, 〈B, s,A,Z,X〉〉, {H(Z)}X}
crl4
def= 11 = 121 = 222 = 31 = 321 ∧ 211 = 324 = 411 ∧ 212 = 2212
= 325 = 42
For each term t , let t˜ be the expression obtained by replacing in t each variable of sort s
with Xs . Finally, let url be the expression (with equality constraints) obtained from t˜rl by
adding (at the top) the constraint crl .
We are now ready to deﬁne the basicity condition.
Deﬁnition 54. A protocol P satisﬁes the basicity condition if, for each rule rl of P , url as
deﬁned above satisﬁes the basicity condition w.r.t. the set of basic sorts.
We tried to give here a deﬁnition which is as general as possible, hence might be a bit
difﬁcult to grasp. Let us give a simple sufﬁcient condition:
Proposition 55. Aprotocol satisﬁes the basicity condition if, for each rule rl of the protocol,
one of the following holds:
• There is at most one variable occurring at least twice in rl and whose sort is not basic.
• There is a decomposition of t l into C[t1, . . . , tn] such that every variable which is not of
sort Agentoccurs in at most one ti .
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For instance, in Example 53, only Y,Z have a nonbasic sort, hence the ﬁrst condition
above is met by every rule.
For simplicity, we often write A and Msg instead of, respectively, XAgent and
XMessage.
Theorem 56. If P satisﬁes the basicity condition, then the secrecy of P is decidable.
In particular, our running example satisﬁes the basicity condition. Indeed, there are at
most two occurrences of nonbasic variables in each expressions. However, note that giving
the ability for agents to recognize messages of the form K(a, b) was not innocent: if we
replace our key variable K by a message variable X then our protocol does not remain in
our decidable class.
We prove the theorem in next section.
6.2. Proof of Theorem 56
The proof of Theorem 56 proceeds in two steps. First, we show that every protocol can be
“translated” into Horn clauses such that a message can be sent if and only if a corresponding
formula can be derived from the Horn clauses. Then, we show that if a protocol satisﬁes the
basicity condition then the corresponding Horn clauses can be expressed as ET-constraints,
thus secrecy is decidable.
Step 1:
Lemma 57. Let P be a protocol with its secrecy policy S0. Let I0 be the maximal set of
initial knowledge of the intruder (compatible with the secrecy policy S0 of P ) mentioned in
Section 2. Then, there exists a set H of Horn clauses with a special predicate I such that
I (m) is derivable from C (where m is a message), iff there exists a reachable H such that
m ∈ H .
Proof. H is built as the union of four sets:Hmsg,HI0 ,HI andHP .
Hmsg corresponds to the construction of the messages with their sort:Hmsg is the union
of the clauses
Psort1(x1) . . . Psortn(xn)
Psort(f (x1, . . . , xn))
for every function symbol f of type sort1 × · · · × sortn → sort, where the Psort
are new predicates. We also add toHmsg the union of the clauses
Psort(x)
Psort′(x)
for every sort,sort′ such that sort is a subsort of sort′. Moreover, we need to distin-
guish between symmetric and public keys: every term is symmetric except the terms of the
190 H. Comon, V. Cortier / Theoretical Computer Science 331 (2005) 143–214
Initial
knowledge
I0(x)
I (x)
Analysis
I (f (x1, . . . , xn))
I (xi )
f ∈ IF , 1 in
I ({x1}x2 ) I (x2) Sym(x2)
I (x1)
I ({x1}pub(x2)) I (prv(x2))
I (x1)
I ({x1}prv(x2)) I (pub(x2))
I (x1)
Synthesis
I (x1) · · · I (xn)
I (f (x1, . . . , xn))
f ∈ PF
I (x1) · · · I (xn) PAd(xj1 ) . . . PAd(xjk )
I (f (x1, . . . , xn))
f ∈ AF ,
f restricted v.s.
j1, . . . , jk
Fig. 8. Horn clauses for the intruder capabilities.
form pub(t) or prv(t). Thus we add toHmsg the clauses
PMessage(x1) . . . PMessage(xn)
Sym(f (x1, . . . , xn))
for every function symbol f , f = pub and f = prv. Then it is easy to prove thatPsort(m)
is derivable fromHmsg if and only ifm is a message of sort sort and Sym(m) is derivable
fromHmsg if and only if m is a symmetric term.
Then, by the following lemma (proved in Appendix C), there exists a set of Horn clauses
HI0 such that I0(m) is derivable fromHI0 ∪Hmsg if and only if m ∈ I0.
Lemma 58. Let t1, . . . , tn be message schemes with the free variables x1, . . . , xk . Then,
there exists a set of Horn clauses HI0 with two predicates I0 and Pp such that I0(m) is
derivable fromHI0 ∪Hmsg if and only if parts(m) ∩ {ti | 1 in,(xi) ∈ Ah} = ∅.
The clauses ofHI are described Fig. 8. They simulate the capabilities of the intruder.
To simulate the protocol rules, we ﬁrst deﬁne the set of expressions types(t) generated by
a message scheme t by induction on t . If t is a constant, then types(t) = ∅. If t is a variable
of sort sort, then types(t) = {Psort(t)}. If t is a term of the form f (t1, . . . , tn), then
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I (si (A,M)) I (M1) · · · I (Mp) types(A,M,M1, . . . ,Mp,M ′1, . . . ,M ′q )
I (si+1(A,M ′))
I (si (A,M)) I (M1) · · · I (Mp) types(A,M,M1, . . . ,Mp,M ′1, . . . ,M ′q )
I (M ′
i
)
For i = 1, . . . , q
Fig. 9. Horn clauses corresponding to the rule {S(A, i,M),M1, . . . ,Mp} −→ {S(A, i + 1,M ′),M ′1, . . . ,M ′q }.
types(t) = ⋃1 intypes(ti). Intuitively types(t) is the set of constraints corresponding
to the sorts of the variables of t . We sometimes write types(t1, t2) instead of
types(t1) ∪ types(t2).
Example 59. Let us consider the message scheme {B,K,X}K of our running example.
Then
types({B,X, Y }shr(A)) = {PAgent(B), PKey(X), PMessage(Y ), PAgent(A)}
ensures that A and B stand for agent variables, X stands for a key variable and Y for a
message variable.
ThenHP is the union, for each rule
{S(A, i,M),M1, . . . ,Mp} −→ {S(A, i + 1,M ′),M ′1, . . . ,M ′q}
of the protocol P , of the clauses described in Fig. 9.
We prove by induction inAppendix C thatH veriﬁes the required property, which concludes
the proof of Lemma 57. 
Remark. The predicate symbols ofH are the Psort, Pp introduced by Lemma 58 and
three distinct predicate symbols: I, I0 and Sym.
Example 60. We present here the clausesHP corresponding to our running example. For
simplicity, we factorize the rules whose premises are identical, letting them contain several
conclusions (though it must be kept in mind that these are Horn clauses).
Initialization rule:
PAgent(A) PAgent(B)
I (s1(A, 〈A,B, s〉)) I (s1(B, 〈B, s〉)), I (s1(s, s))
.
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Rule 1:
PAgent(A) PAgent(B) I (s1(A, 〈A,B, s〉))
I (s2(A, 〈A,B, s〉)) I (〈A,B〉)
.
Rule 2:
PAgent(A) PAgent(B) I (s1(s, s)) I (〈A,B〉)
I (s2(s, s)) I ({B,K(A,B), {xA,K(A,B)}shr(B)}shr(A))
.
Rule 3:
PAgent(A) PAgent(B) PKey(X) PMessage(Y )
I (s2(A, 〈A,B, s〉)) I ({B,X, Y }shr(A))
I (s3(A, 〈A,B, s,X,m(A,B)〉)) I (〈{m(A,B)}X, Y 〉)
and similarly for Rule 4.
Step 2: We can start the second part of the proof of Theorem 56. We write H3E when
E is derivable fromH.
Let P be a protocol. Its secrecy policy S0 is deﬁned by
S0 =
s⋃
j=1
{
t
j
1 , . . . , t
j
nj | xj1 , . . . , xjkj ∈ Ak
}
,
where the tji are message schemes with free variables x
j
1 , . . . , x
j
kj
. By deﬁnition of secrecy,
P is not secure iff there exists a reachable H such that fake(Cont(H) ∪ I0) ∩ S0 = ∅, i.e.,
iff there exists a reachable H ′ such that Cont(H ′) ∩ S0 = ∅, i.e.,
iff there exists a reachable H ′, ∃i, j , ∃ai1 , . . . , aip ∈ Ah such that tji (ai1 , . . . , aip ) ∈ H ′
iff, by Lemma 57, ∃i, j, ∃ai1 , . . . , aip ∈ Ah such thatH3I (tji (ai1 , . . . , aip )).
Thus, we are left to prove that ∃i, j, ∃ai1 , . . . , aip ∈ Ah such that H3I (tji (ai1 , . . . ,
aip )) is decidable.
We express the setH of Horn clauses as a set constraint: the set of deﬁnite set constraint
corresponding to Hmsg is the set Cmsg described in Section 6.1 augmented with the
inclusions:
f (Msg, . . . ,Msg) ⊆ XSym
for every function symbol f ∈ F , f = pub, f = prv.
The deﬁnite set constraint CI corresponding toHI is described in Fig. 10. The set of deﬁnite
set constraint CI0 corresponding toHI0 is constructed similarly.
We associate with each Horn clause described in Fig. 9 the following ET-constraint:
〈si(A, M˜) ∩ I, M˜1 ∩ I, . . . , M˜p ∩ I, si+1(A, M˜ ′), M˜ ′1, . . . , M˜ ′q〉crl ⊂ I, (9)
where crl and ·˜ are deﬁned in Section 6.1. The union of these ET-constraint is denoted
by CP .
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Initial
knowledge I0 ⊆ I
Analysis f (I, . . . , I ) ⊆ I f ∈ IF
{}−11 ({Msg}I∩Sym ∩ I ) ⊆ I
{}−11 ({Msg}prv(pub−1(I )) ∩ I ) ⊆ I {}−11 ({Msg}pub(prv−1(I )) ∩ I ) ⊆ I
Synthesis f−1
i
(I ) ⊆ I f ∈ PF , iarity(f )
f (1, . . . , n) ⊆ I
f ∈ AF ,
f restricted v.s. j1, . . . , jk
m = XAd if ∃i, m = ji ,
m = I otherwise.
Fig. 10. Set constraints corresponding to the intruder capabilities.
Example 61. The Horn clause corresponding to rule 3 of our running example is expressed
by
〈s2(A, 〈A,A, s〉) ∩ I, {A,XKey,Msg}shr(A) ∩ I,
s3(A, 〈A,A, s,XKey,m(A,A)〉), 〈{m(A,A)}XKey ,Msg〉〉crl3 ⊆ I,
where crl3 is the equality constraint described in Eq. (5), Section 6.1.
Let C be the union of Cmsg, CI0 , CI and CP . The set variables of C are the variables
Xsort for each sort sort and the four additional variables: Xp, which corresponds to
Pp, I, I0 and XSym.
C is a faithful representation ofH:
Lemma 62. LetM be a collection of sets SQ for every (unary) predicate symbolQ. Then
M is a model ofH iff the substitution M assigning XQ to SQ is a solution of C.
Proof. LetM be a model ofH and let us show that M satisﬁes C.
The only nonobvious part of the proof is to show that SI satisﬁes the set constraint deﬁned
in Eq. (9). Let rl be a rule of the protocol, let
t ∈ 〈si(A, M˜) ∩ SI , M˜1 ∩ SI , . . . , M˜p ∩ SI , si+1(A, M˜ ′), M˜ ′1, . . . , M˜ ′q〉
such that t satisﬁes crl. t = 〈si(a,m),m1, . . . , mp, si+1(a,m′),m′1, . . . , m′q〉 and
si(a,m),m1, . . . , mp ∈ SI . Since t satisﬁes crl, by applying the clause deﬁned in
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Fig. 9, we deduce si+1(a,m′),m′1, . . . , m′q ∈ SI , thus, by applying the clause
I (m1) I (m2)
I (〈m1,m2〉)
, t is in SI ,
thus SI satisﬁes constraint 9.
Conversely, let M be a model of C. The only nonobvious part of the proof is to
show that SI satisﬁes the Horn clause deﬁned in Fig. 9. Let m = M′,m = M ′,
mi = Mi′,m′i = M ′i, a = A′ such that si(a,m),m1, . . . , mp ∈ SI and ′ satis-
ﬁes the conditions cond(A,M,M1, . . . ,Mp,M ′1, . . . ,M ′q). Thus for every variable X of
A,M,M1, . . . ,Mp,M
′
1, . . . ,M
′
q , 
′(X) ∈ I(S
X˜
): ′ respects the type of the variables. Let
t = 〈si(a,m),m1, . . . , mp, si+1(a,m′),m′1, . . . , m′q〉, then
t ∈ 〈si(A, M˜) ∩ SI , M˜1 ∩ SI , . . . , M˜p ∩ SI ,
si+1(A, M˜ ′), M˜ ′1, . . . , M˜ ′q〉
and, by construction of crl, t satisﬁes crl. Thus t is in SI . Applying the set constraint
〈〉−1i (SI ) ⊆ SI , we get si+1(a,m′),m′1, . . . , m′q ∈ SI , thus SI satisﬁes the Horn clause
deﬁned in Fig. 9. 
Then
∃i, ∃ai1 , . . . , aip ∈ Ah such thatH3I (ti(ai1 , . . . , aip ))
if and only if
C⋃
i
I ∩ ti (XAh, . . . , XAh) ⊆⊥
is not satisﬁable.
First, if ∃i, ∃ai1 , . . . , aip ∈ Ah such thatH3I (ti(ai1 , . . . , aip )) then
C⋃iI ∩ ti (XAh, . . . , XAh) ⊆⊥is clearly not satisﬁable.
Now, assume ∀i,∀ai1 , . . . , aip ∈ Ah H  3I (ti(ai1 , . . . , aip )) and consider the least
HerbrandmodelM ofH. ThenM also models every negative clause of the form¬I (ti(ai1 ,
. . . , aip )). Applying Lemma 62, M is a solution for:
C⋃iI ∩ ti (XAh, . . . , XAh) ⊆⊥.
Assume now that P satisﬁes the basicity condition as in Theorem 56, then the set C as
constructed above is a set of ET-constraints. Thus
C⋃
i
I ∩ ti (XAh, . . . , XAh) ⊆⊥
is also a set of ET-constraints. Then, thanks toTheorem52, the satisﬁability of this constraint
is decidable, which completes the proof of Theorem 56.
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7. Conclusion
Let us summarize the contributions of the paper (roughly in increasing order of signiﬁ-
cance) and discuss their meaning and possible further developments.
1. The security of a protocol P is undecidable, even for a restricted class in which there
are no nonces, no compound keys and there is at least one honest instance of P . This
is Theorem 6. This shows that the source of undecidability does not come from nonces,
but from the memorization and copying facilities of the agents.
2. The satisﬁability of intersection constraints with nonemptiness guards is DEXPTIME-
complete. This is Theorem 11. It is a slight extension of results about set constraints.
3. We introduced the new class of tree automata with one memory and we showed that
the emptiness is DEXPTIME-complete for this class. This is Theorem 15. This result is
interesting in itself. One open question is its generalization with disequality tests (and
not only equality tests between memory contents).
4. We introduced a class of set constraints with equality tests, in which the tests are not
restricted to brother positions.We showed the decidability of constraints in this class by a
reduction to tree automata with one memory. This is Theorem 52. It must be emphasized
that we did not use the full power of automata with one memory here.
Interpreting Lemma 39 in the context of cryptographic protocols, it shows that, for basic
variables, we may restrict our attention to ﬁnitely many instances (the representatives
w.r.t. an appropriate equivalence relation). This shows in particular that we can assume
w.l.o.g. that there is a bounded number of principals (the bound is given by the index of
the equivalence relation).
One possible research direction is to investigate generalizations of this lemma, for in-
stance in the context of nonces: is there an equivalence relation (preserving the solutions)
which reduces the general case to the case of ﬁnitely many nonces ? Such a result would
not necessarily contradict the undecidability result of [18] since the protocol resulting
from the coding of that paper does not satisfy the basicness hypothesis. In other words,
as suggested by Theorem 6, the key for deciding the secrecy of cryptographic protocols
might be to limit the copying facilities of the agents, not the number of sessions or nonces
they generate.
5. We showed the decidability of secrecy for a class of cryptographic protocols, without
any assumptions on the number of sessions (whether parallel or not). This is Theorem
56. This result is obtained by a reduction to set constraints with equality tests, but we
did not use the full power of such constraints.
The use of set constraints, abstracting away the order in which messages have been sent
over the network is proved to be relevant.Also, the ability of agents to recognize different
types of data appeared clearly as a simpliﬁcation factor, which can be tuned so that we
fall in or out of the decidable class.We have showed the relationship between this ability
and the copying facilities of the agents: the more they are able to distinguish between
different data types, the more they are allowed to copy blindly pieces of messages,
without escaping from the decidable class.
There are still several weaknesses in our paper. First, the constraint solving technique is
too complex: we conjecture that our algorithm is in DEXPTIME, though we only showed
a doubly exponential upper bound. It is also too complicated for the applications we have
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in mind. That is mainly because we tried to be as general as possible. However, most of
the time, we do not need such general constraints. In particular, we can avoid the most
complicated step (Lemma 28) simply by designing normalized constraints only.
Finally the big open question is the extension of these results to an unbounded number
of nonces.
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 28
Lemma 28 (Every expression). e which satisﬁes the basicity condition can be transformed
into a normal expression e′ such that, for every , [[e]] = [[e′]] and, moreover |e′|F and
|e′|t are polynomially bounded by |e|t and |e′|F .
Note ﬁrst that condition 2 is initially satisﬁed by all expressions since we assumed that
any two expressions in P(c) are incomparable with respect to the preﬁx ordering.
We are going to perform successive transformations, verifyingmore andmore conditions,
while preserving those which have already been reached. Initially, we only assume that
condition 1 is satisﬁed, as stated in the hypothesis of the lemma.
Step 1: The goal of this step is to ensure, in addition to properties 1 and 2 a property,
which implies condition 3.
If c is an equality test andp is a position, wewritep ·c the equality test∧q∼cr p ·q = p ·r .
In addition to condition 3, we want to ensure that in any expression gc(. . . , ei , . . .) such
that, for some c1, i · c1 ⊆ c, if ei = f c′(e′) ∩ e′′, then P(c1) ⊆ (f c′(e′)).
To deﬁne our rule, we ﬁrst need to introduce a new equivalence relation:
Deﬁnition 63. Given an equality test c such that c is satisﬁable, we deﬁne-c and Sc to be
the least set S and equivalence relation - such that:
p ∼c q ⇒ p, q ∈ S and p - q
p ∼c′ q ⇒ p, q ∈ S and p - q
p - q ⇒ q - p
p - q, q - r ⇒ p - r
p · q ∈ S
p - p′
}
⇒
{
p′ · q ∈ S
p · q - p′ · q
Lemma 64. The ﬁxed point for -c and Sc is reached after a ﬁnite number of steps. In
addition, there exists an order c on the equivalence classes of -c such that ucu′
implies that no position of u is a preﬁx of a position of u′.
Proof (sketch). First, if there are two nonempty positions such that p · q - p then c is
unsatisﬁable: by induction (on the ﬁxed point computation of S,-), if t  c ∧ c′, then
for every p - q, t  p = q. Since we are only considering ﬁnite terms, we cannot have
t |p = t |p·q .
Consider the DAG G whose vertices are elements of P(c) ∪ P(c′) and (labeled) edges
p
i−→ p · i. Then, for each p ∼ci p′, merge the two corresponding vertices. We get a
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Fig. 11. G and Gf for c.
new graph Gf , whose set of vertices is contained in the original set of vertices. Then, by
induction (on the ﬁxed point computation of S,-), S is included in the set of paths of in
Gf and if p - q, then the path labeled by p and those labeled by q leads to the same vertex
(starting from the vertex ).
As we have seen above,Gf is acyclic, thus S and- are ﬁnite, thus the ﬁxed point for S,-
is reached after a ﬁnite number of steps. Note that the number of vertices of Gf is smaller
or equal to the number of vertices of G (Fig. 11).
Since Gf is acyclic, Gf induces an order  on its vertices such that if vv′ than no
path leading to the vertex v is a preﬁx of a path leading to the vertex v′. Each equivalence
class u of - is included in the set of paths of one of the vertex vu of the graph. We ﬁrst
order arbitrarily the equivalence classes which lead to the same vertices and then we extend
this order by ucu′ if vuvu′ and vu = vu′ . Then ucu′ implies that no position of u is
a preﬁx of a position of u′. 
Example 65. Consider cdef=1 = 21 ∧ 3 = 41 ∧ 2 = 31. Then, the graphs G and Gf are
pictured in Fig. 11 and
-c= {1 = 21, 3 = 41, 2 = 31, 21 = 311, 31 = 411, 311 = 4111}.
In addition, we deﬁne the equality test ce of an expression e by induction on e by:
ce1∧...∧en = ce1 ∧ . . . ∧ cen
cf c(e1,...,en) = c ∧ 1 · ce1 ∧ . . . ∧ n · cen ∧ 1 = 1 ∧ . . . ∧ n = n
Let -ce be the equivalence relation corresponding to ce and u1, . . . , un be its equivalence
classes numbered in such a way that uiceuj implies ij (this is possible thanks to
Lemma 64).
Then, (N1) is the successive application of Nu1 , . . . , Nun where
(Nu) e → e


⋂
p′∈u∩(e)
e′′∈e|p′
e′′


p∈u∩(e)
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Note. The rule (N1) is obviously terminating since it requires at most as many steps as
the number of classes modulo -ce . However, its complexity is unclear. We conjecture for
instance that |e′|F is polynomially bounded by |e|F and |e|t .
Lemma 66. (N1) preserves the semantics as well as properties 1 and 2.
Proof. For every equivalence class u and for every p1, p2 ∈ u ∩ (e), by construction,
ce  p1 = p2. Hence the rule preserves the semantics.
Now, it preserves properties 1 and 2 since it consists in repeatedly replacing an expression
e′ with the intersection of e′ and other expressions, without changing the tests and, if an
expression is basic, then its intersection with any other expression is also basic. 
Lemma 67. If e′ is the result applying (N1) to e, then:
• ∀p ∈ Sce ∩(e′), e′|p is a singleton.
• ∀p -ce p′, e′|p = e′|p′ .
• if e′|p = f c(e1, . . . , en) ∩ e′′, then p · c ⊆-ce and for all 1 in, p · i ∈ Sce .
• if p ∈ (e′) and p〉p′ for some p′ ∈ ui where ui is minimal for c, then e′|p ⊆⋃
q∈(e)e|q .
• if e′|p = f c(e1, . . . , en) ∩ f c′(e′1, . . . , e′n) ∩ e′′ then for every i = 1, .., n, ei = e′i .
Proof. We prove by induction on k that if e′ is the result of applying Nu1 . . . Nuk to e, then
for all ik,
1. ∀p ∈ ui ∩(e′), e′|p is a singleton.
2. ∀p, p′ ∈ ui ∩(e′), e′|p = e′|p′ .
3. if e′|p = f c(e1, . . . , en) ∩ e′′, then p · c ⊆-ce and for all 1 in, p · i ∈ Sce .
4. if p ∈ (e′) and p〉p′ for some p′ ∈ ui ∩(e′), ik where ui is minimal for c, then
e′|p ⊆ S(e), where S(e)def=⋃q∈(e)e|q .
If k = 0, i.e., no rule has been applied, then 1, 2 and 4 are true. 3 is true by construction of
Sce and -ce .
Assume it is proved for k and let us prove the property for k + 1. We consider e′′ the result
of e′ by Nuk+1 where e′ is the result of e by the application of Nu1 . . . Nuk .
e′′ = e′


⋂
p′∈uk+1∩(e′)
e′′′∈e′|p′
e′′′


p∈uk+1∩(e′)
.
Consider q, q ′ ∈ ui ∩(e′′), i〈k + 1.
• either q is incomparable with the paths of uk+1∩(e), then e′′|q = e′|q and, by induction
hypothesis, e|q is a singleton.
• or there exists p ∈ uk+1 ∩(e) such that qp, i.e. q = p · q1, then
e′′|q = e′


⋂
p′∈uk+1∩(e′)
e′′′|q1∈e′|p′
e′′′


p∈uk+1∩(e′)
.
H. Comon, V. Cortier / Theoretical Computer Science 331 (2005) 143–214 199
By construction of our equivalence relation, since p - p′ and p · q1 ∈ ui , we have
p′ · q1 ∈ ui . Thus, by induction hypothesis e′|p′·q1 = e′|p·q1 and is a singleton, thus
e′′|q = e′|q .
• or there exists p ∈ uk+1 ∩(e) such that q〈p, which is impossible by the choice of the
order on the equivalence classes.
Conclusion: in any cases, we have that e′′|q = e′|p is a singleton and e′′|q = e′′|q ′ . Assume
p〉q for some p ∈ (e′′) and assume ui is minimal w.r.t. c, then e′′|q = e′|p ⊆ S(e) by
induction.
Consider q, q ′ ∈ uk+1∩(e′′). Assume q ∈ (e′). Then q is a path created by application
of Nuk+1 . This means that there exists p ∈ uk+1 ∩(e′) such that p is a strict preﬁx of q
which contradicts Gf acyclic.
Thus q, q ′ are in uk+1 ∩(e′), thus by construction
e′′|q = e′′|q ′ = ⋂
p′∈uk+1∩(e′)
e′′′∈e′|p′
e′′′
is a singleton. Assume p〉q, i.e. p = q · p1, for some p ∈ (e′′) and assume ui is minimal
w.r.t. c, then for all p′ ∈ uk+1 ∩(e′), we have e′|p′ = e|p′ , since by minimality of uk+1
no rule can have been applied above p′ for p′ ∈ uk+1 ∩(e′). Thus
e′′|p = ⋃
p′∈uk+1∩(e)
e′′′∈e|p′
e′′′|p1 ⊆ S(e)
It remains to prove 3: assume e′′|q = f c(e1, . . . , en) ∩ e4. Then, either q is incomparable
with the paths of uk+1∩(e′), then e′′|q = e′|q and we can apply the induction hypothesis.
Or q〈p for some p ∈ uk+1 ∩(e′), then e′|q = f c(e′1, . . . , e′n) ∩ e4′) and 3 is ensured by
induction. Or (last case) qp for some p ∈ uk+1 ∩(e′), then q = p · q1 and there exists
p′ ∈ uk+1 ∩(e′) such that e′′|q = e′|p′·q1 . Thus, by induction hypothesis p′ · c ∈-ce and
for every 1 in, p′ · i ∈ Sce . Now, by construction of -ce and Sce , since p -ce p′, we
have p · c ∈-ce and for every 1 in, p · i ∈ Sce .
Now consider the last property. ce contains the identities p = p for p ∈ (e). Hence, if
f c(e1, . . . , en)∩f c′(e′1, . . . , e′n)∩ e′′ ∈ e′|p, then ei = e′i is the intersection of expressions
e|p′ such that p · i -ce p′ (note that ei, e′i ∈ e′|p·i . 
Thanks to Lemma 67, we have the required properties:
Corollary 68. If e′ is the result of e by the application of (N1), then for every equality
test, if p ∼c q then the expressions at positions p and q in e′ are identical. In addition, in
any expression gc(. . . , ei , . . .) such that, for some c1, i · c1 ⊆ c, if ei = f c′(e′) ∩ e′′, then
P(c1) ⊆ (f c′(e′)).
Example 69. Consider
e = f 1=21∧3=41(X, g(X), Y, g(Y )) ∩ f 2=31(X1, Z, g(Z),X2)
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e
Nu1→ e1def=f 1=21∧3=41(X ∩X1, g(X ∩X1), Y, g(Y ))
∩f 2=31(X ∩X1, Z, g(Z),X2)
e1
Nu2→ e2def=f 1=21∧3=41(X ∩X1, Z ∩ g(X ∩X1), Y, g(Y ))
∩f 2=31(X ∩X1, Z ∩ g(X ∩X1), g(Z ∩ g(X ∩X1)),X2)
e2
Nu3→ e3def=f 1=21∧3=41(X ∩X1, Z ∩ g(X ∩X1), Y ∩ g(Z ∩ g(X ∩X1)),
g(Y ∩ g(Z ∩ g(X ∩X1))))
∩f 2=31(X ∩X1, Z ∩ g(X ∩X1), Y ∩ g(Z ∩ g(X ∩X1)),X2)
e3
Nu3→ e3def=f 1=21∧3=41(X ∩X1, Z ∩ g(X ∩X1), Y ∩ g(Z ∩ g(X ∩X1)),
X2 ∩ g(Y ∩ g(Z ∩ g(X ∩X1))))
∩f 2=31(X ∩X1, Z ∩ g(X ∩X1), Y ∩ g(Z ∩ g(X ∩X1)),
X2 ∩ g(Y ∩ g(Z ∩ g(X ∩X1))))
Fig. 12. Reduction of e by (N1).
Then ce
def=1 = 21 ∧ 3 = 41 ∧ 2 = 31 and the equivalence classes of -ce are:
u1 = {1, 2 · 1, 3 · 1 · 1, 4 · 1 · 1 · 1}, u2 = {2, 3 · 1, 4 · 1 · 1}, u3 = {3.4 · 1},
u4 = {4}
The successive applications of Nu1 , Nu2 , Nu3 and Nu4 are described in Fig. 12.
Note that, now, “every expression in e|p is basic” is equivalent to “there is an expression
in e|p which is basic” since the intersection of a basic expression with any other expression
yields a basic expression. That is why, from now on, we may say, by abuse of language that
“e|p is basic” to mean either of the two above versions.
We consider, in addition to the rule (N1), the following “cleaning” rules:
(N2) f
c(e1, . . . , en) ∩ f (e′1, . . . , e′n)→ f c(e1 ∩ e′1, . . . , en ∩ e′n)
(N3) f
c(e1, . . . , en) ∩ gc′(e′1, . . . , e′m)→⊥ if f = g.
Lemma 70. The rules (N2), (N3), applied to normal forms w.r.t. (N1), preserve the seman-
tics as well as properties 1, 2, 3 and the properties described in Lemma 67.
Proof. First, by Lemma 67, in any application of (N2), we must have ei = e′i . Then, it is
sufﬁcient to notice that ce is unchanged by application of (N2), hence its application does
not trigger (N1) and preserves the properties of Lemma 67. 
Step 2: We start with some properties of equality tests.
Lemma 71. Let j · c1 be the subset of c2 containing all equalities whose both sides are
preﬁxed by j . If c2 satisﬁes the basicity condition in e and e satisﬁes condition 3, then c1
satisﬁes the basicity condition in every expression belonging to e|j .
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Proof. Let p · i1 · q ∼c1 p′, i1 = i2 and p′prefp. Then j · p · i1 · q ∼c2 j · p′ and
j ·p′prefj ·p. By basicity of c2, either e|j ·p′ is basic or e|j ·p·i2 contains basic expressions
only or else j · p · i2 · w ∼c2 j · p′ for some w, which implies p · i2 · w ∼c1 p′. 
Lemma 72. If c satisﬁes the basicity condition in e and c1 is an equivalence class of c,
then c \ c1 satisﬁes the basicity condition in e.
Proof. Let p · i1 · q ∼c\c1 p′, i1 = i2 and p′prefp. Then p · i1 · q ∼c p′ and, by basicity
of c, either e|p′ or every expression in e|p·i2 is basic or else p · i2 · w ∼c p′for some w. In
the latter case, since c1 is an equivalence class, p · i2 · w ∼c\c1 p′. 
Now, we use the following two transformation rules:
(N4) f
c∧j ·c1(. . . , ej , . . .)→ f c∧j ·c1
(
. . . , ej ∩ gc1
(
e1j , . . . , e
kj
j
)
, . . .
)
if ej = gc′
(
e1j , . . . , e
kj
j
)
∩ e′′ and c does not contain any test whose both sides are preﬁxed
by j .
(N5) f
c∧p1·c1∧...∧pn·cn(e)→ f c(e)
if p1 · c1 ∪ . . . pn · cn is a union of equivalence classes, every pi is non empty and, for every
i, there is an expression ei at position pi in f c∧...(e) such that ei = gc′i ( e′i )∩ e′′i and c′i  ci .
(In words: we may remove classes which are consequences of equality tests lower in the
expression).
Lemma 73. (N4) and (N5) preserve conditions 3, 1 and 2. An expression which is un-
changed by application of these two rules satisﬁes condition 4. Moreover, the size (w.r.t.
F ) is preserved by the two rules, the size (w.r.t. t) is reduced by the second rule and, using
repeatedly the ﬁrst rule in an expression e results in an expression e′ such that |e′|t |e|2t .
Proof (sketch). By Lemmas 71 and 72, these transformations preserve condition 1 and they
preserve trivially condition 3.
Condition 2 is also preserved since we did not merge any equality test so far.
The satisfaction of condition 4 follows from an inspection of the expressions which are
left unchanged by any application of these rules.
The preservation of |e|F follows from the deﬁnition. If c yields a new test c′, possibly
after repeated applications of (N4), then there is a p1 such that c′ consists in equalities
p = q such that p1 · p ∼c p1 · q. If we ﬁx the size of p1, then the sum of sizes of such c′
is bounded by |c|. Hence the total size of the new tests is bounded by |c|2. 
Step 3: The purpose of this step is to show how to satisfy in addition condition 5, while
preserving properties 3, 1,4, 2. In what follows, integers i, j... are always assumed range
over a ﬁnite set 1..n which is consistent with the arity of function symbols.
Let e be an expression f c( e1)∩f c′( e2)∩ . . .. If e is in normal form w.r.t. (Ni), i5, then
we may assume that e1 = e2. Indeed, this is true of normal forms w.r.t. (N1), (N2), (N3)
thanks to Lemmas 67 and 70, and such a property is trivially preserved by the rules
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Fig. 13. A representation ofQ(c0, c′) andQm(c0, c′).
(N4), (N5).Wewill however only assume inwhat follows theweaker property(f c( e1)) =
(f c
′
( e2)).
We deﬁne c . c′ (relatively to e) as follows: ﬁrst, if c ∧ c′ is unsatisﬁable, we replace it
with ⊥. Otherwise, for every nontrivial equivalence class c0 for c, let
Q(c0, c
′) = {w | ∃p ∈ P(c0), p · w ∈ P(c′), e|p·w not basic }
and
Qm(c0, c
′)= {w · i | ∃w′ ∈ Q(c0, c′), w〈prefw′, ∀w′ ∈ Q(c0, c′),
×w · i  〈prefw′}.
Intuitively,Qm(c0, c′) is the border ofQ(c0, c′) with its maximal elements. See Fig. 13.
Each timeQ(c0, c′) is empty, we let c0 = c0 and, otherwise:
c0
c′ def= ∧
p∼c0q
∧
w∈Qm(c0,c′)
p · w = q · w.
Then
cc
′ def= ∧
c0a class of c
c0
c′ .
We deﬁne now the sequence cn as follows: c1 = c, c′1 = c′ and cn+1 def= cnc
′
n and
c′n+1
def= c′ncn .
Note that if p ·w = q ·w ∈ cc′ , then p ·w, q ·w ∈ (f c( e1)) = (f c′( e2)). Moreover,
if c = c, then |c|〉|c|. It follows that the sequences cn and c′n are ultimately stationary: let
c∞ and c′∞ be the respective limit values of cn and c′n. We deﬁne
c . c′ def= c∞ ∧ c′∞.
Example 74. Let us consider c def= 1 = 2 and c′ def= 211 = 3 ∧ 11 = 4 and assume that
every position of c or c′ is not basic. Then c . c′ is computed in two steps:
Step 1: Q(c, c′) = {11, 1} thusQm(c, c′) = {11}.
Q(c′1, c) = Q(c′2, c) = ∅ where c′1 = 211 = 3 and c′2 = 11 = 4.
Thus c2
def= cc′ = 111 = 211 and c′2 def= c′
c = c′ = 211 = 3 ∧ 11 = 4.
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Step 2: Q(c2, c′2) = ∅.
Let c12
′ def= 211 = 3 and c22 ′ def= 11 = 4, then Q(c12 ′, c2) = ∅ and Q(c22 ′, c2) = {1}
thusQm(c22
′
, c2) = {1}.
Thus c3
def= c2c′2 = c2 = 111 = 211 and c′3 def= c′2
c2 = 211 = 3 ∧ 111 = 41.
c3
c′3 = c3, c′3
c3 = c′3, thus c . c′ def= 111 = 211 ∧ 211 = 3 ∧ 111 = 41.
Let us analyze a bit more precisely the complexity: for every pair p ∼c.c′ q, there is a
position r ∈ P(c) ∪ P(c′) such that p = p1 · i and r = p1 · r1. Then, if a is the maximal
arity of a function symbol, then
|P(c . c′)|(|c| + |c′|)× a,
where a is the maximal arity of a function symbol and since the number of possible choices
for p1 is bounded by |c| + |c′|. It follows that
|c . c′|(|c| + |c′|)×M(c, c′)× aa × (|c| + |c′|)2,
whereM(c, c′) is the maximal length of a position in P(c) ∪ P(c′).
Then we use the following transformation rule:
(N6) f
c(e1, . . . , en) ∩ f c′(e′1, . . . , e′n)→ f c.c
′
(e1 ∩ e′1, . . . , en ∩ e′n)
if(f c(e)) = (f c′(e′)).
First, P(c), P (c′) ⊆ (f (e)), thanks to property 3. It follows that P(c.c′) ⊆ (f (e)).
The semantics is also preserved since, as long as all positions p · i and q · i are in(f c(e)),
and the top symbols at positions p and q are identical, an equality test p = q ∈ c is
equivalent to the conjunction of equality tests p · i = q · i.
Condition 3 is also trivially satisﬁed. Remains to verify the preservation of the other ones:
condition 4 is shown to be preserved in Lemma 75, condition 1 in Lemma 76, condition 2
in Lemma 77.
Lemma 75. The rule preserves property 4.
Proof. Actually, every c0 and c′0 satisfy property 4. Indeed, if, in the class c0 of p (in c), q
does not share any preﬁx with p, then in the class of p · w (w.r.t. c0), q · w does not share
any preﬁx with p · w. 
Lemma 76. The transformation preserves the basicity condition.
Proof. It sufﬁces to show that c∧c′ satisﬁes the basicity condition, whenever c, c′ do. Then
we use an induction on the ﬁxed point computation for c . c′.
Assume p · i · q ∼
c∧c′ p
′
, p′prefp, j = i and, for every w, p · j · w ∼c∧c′ p′. Then
p is not empty. Assume w.l.o.g that p · i · q, p′ ∈ P(c0) where c0 is an equivalence class
of c. (If this is not the case, exchange the roles of c and c′). Then, by Lemma 75, there is a
p′1 ∼c0 p · i · q such that p is not a preﬁx of p′1. Hence we may assume w.l.o.g. that p is
not a preﬁx of p′ (possibly after replacing p′ with some p′1).
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If p · i · q ∼c p′, then the result follows from the basicity property of c: in such a case,
we must have c0 = c0 (since, in any case, either c0 = c0 or P(c0) ∩ P(c0) = ∅), hence
p · j · w ∼c p′ iff p · j · w ∼c∧c′ p′.
Let us assume now that this is not the case: c0 = c0, p · i · q = p0 · w0 · i0 with
w0 · i0 ∈ Qm(c0, c′) and p0 ∼c q0.
p · i · q = p0 · w0 · i0
p′ = q0 · w0 · i0
p0 ∼c q0 ∼c p′0
p′0 · p1 ∼c′ q1
e|p′0·p1 is not basic
and
{
w0〈prefp1
w0 · i0  〈prefp1
In addition, we may assume, thanks to property 4 again that p0 and q0 on one hand and p′0
and q1 on the other hand do not share any nontrivial preﬁx.
Case 1: p〈prefp0. There is a q ′ such that p0 = p · i · q ′. We use the basicity property of
c, considering the equivalence p · i · q ′ ∼c q0: either e|p·j is basic or e|p0 is basic or
p ·j ·w ∼c p0 for somew. In the ﬁrst two cases, we get what we want (e|p0 basic implies
ep·i·q basic). In the last case, p ·j ·w ·w0 · i0 ∼c0 p′ by construction, hence contradicting
the hypothesis ∀w′.p · j · w′ ∼
c∧c′ p
′
.
Case 2: p0 · w0〉prefpprefp0. Since w0 · i0  〈prefp1 and w0prefp1, p1 = w0 · j0 ·  for
some j0 = i0 and .We apply now the basicity property of c′, considering the equivalence
p′0 · w0 · j0 ·  ∼c′ q1 (recall that p′0 · p1 ∼c′ q1). Since e|p′0·p1 is not basic, only two
cases can occur:
Case 2.1: e|p′0·w0·i0 is basic which implies e|p0·w0·i0 basic, hence thedesired conclusion.
Case 2.2: p′0 ·w0 · i0 ·w ∼c′ q1 ∼c′ p′0 ·p1 for somew. Let p = p0 ·p2, w0 = p2 · i ·w1.
Then p′0 ·p2 · i ·w1 · i0 ·w ∼c′ q1 and, since i = j , by the basicity of c′, either ep′0·p2·j
is basic or e|q1 is basic or else there is a w2 such that p′0 · p2 · j · w2 ∼c′ q1.
In the ﬁrst case, e|p0·p2·j is also basic (i.e. e|p·j is basic) and we conclude.
The second case contradicts the hypothesis that e|p′0·p1 is not basic.
In the third case, p′0 · p2 · j ·w2 ∼c′ p′0 · p1 ∼c′ p′0 ·w0 · i0. Then, by construction,
p0 ·w0 · i0 ∼c∧c′ p0 · p2 · j ·w2 = p · j ·w2, which contradicts again the hypothesis.
Case 3: p = p0 · w0, i = i0 and q is empty. p1 = w0 ·j0 ·with j0 = i0. If j = j0, from
e|p′0·p1 is not basic, we conclude the desired result. Otherwise, j = j0 and we use the
basicity property of c′, considering again p′0 ·w0 · j0 ·  ∼c′ q1, j = j0. Either e|p′0·w0·j
is basic (in which case we also conclude) or there is w′1 p′0 · p1 ∼c′ p′0 · w0 · j · w′1.
In the latter case, we use again the basicity property on c′, consideringp′0 ·w0 ·j0 · ∼c′
q1, i = j0. Either e|p′0·w0·i0 is basic, in which case we conclude, or else there is aw′2 such
that p′0 ·p1 ∼c′ p′0 ·w0 · i0 ·w′2. Now, let us recall that, by construction, ∀w′ ∈ Q(c0, c′),
w0 · i0  〈prefw′. Since w0 · i0 · w′1 ∈ Q(c0, c′), we must have w′1 empty.
e|p′0·w0·i0 is basic (in which case we conclude) or
It follows that p′0 ·w0 · i0 ∼c′ p′0 ·w0 · j ·w′2, which contradicts p · i ∼c∧c′ p · j ·w′2.

Lemma 77. The transformation (N6) preserves property 2.
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Proof. We prove, by induction on n that
1. for every p · q, p ∈ P(cn) ∪ P(c′n) such that q is not empty, either e|p·q is a basic
expression or else cn+1 = cn or c′n+1 = c′n.
2. cn and c′n (individually) satisfy property 2.
The lemma will follow.
For every n, if p ∈ P(cn) and if p ·q ∈ P(c′n) and if e|p·q is not basic, then q ∈ Q(0, c′n)
by deﬁnition (0 is the equivalence class ofp) and, since q is not empty, a sufﬁx of q belongs
toQm(0, c
′
n). It follows that 0c
′
n = 0 and therefore cn+1 = cn. So, from now on we may
assume w.l.o.g that both p and p · q are in P(cn).
In the base case, cn = c and c′n = c′ and c, c′ satisfy condition 2. Then, if p, p ·q ∈ P(c),
e|p·q is basic.
Consider now the induction step and let p ∈ P(0c
′
n), p · q ∈ P(1c
′
n), q is not empty
and 0, 1 are classes of cn.
Assume ﬁrst that 0c
′
n = 0. Then, according to the deﬁnition of cn+1, there are positions
such that:
p = p1 · w · i
w〈prefw′
p2 ∼cn p1
p2 · w′ ∈ P(c′n)
e|p2·w′ is not basic
∀w′′ ∈ Q(0, c′n), w · i  〈prefw′′
We consider now several cases for p · q.
Case 1: p · q ∈ P(1c
′
n), 1
c′n = 1 ⊆ cn . Thenp1〈prefp·q andwe conclude using prop-
erty 2 on cn (induction hypothesis).
Case 2: p · q ∈ P(1), 1 = 1 ⊆ cn . Then, by deﬁnition, there are positions such
that:
p · q = p3 · w1 · i1
w1〈prefw′1
p4 ∼cn p3
p4 · w′1 ∈ P(c′n)
e|p4·w′1 is not basic∀w′′1 ∈ Q(1, c′n), w1 · i1  〈prefw′′1
In this case, p · q = p3 · w1 · i1 = p1 · w · i · q, hence p3 and p1 must be comparable
w.r.t. the preﬁx ordering. If they are distinct, assume pk is the largest one, then, by property
2 on cn, e|pk must be basic, hence e|p or e|p·q must be basic and we conclude. Other-
wise, p1 = p3 and 0 = 1. By hypothesis, ∀w′′ ∈ Q(0, c′n), w · i  〈prefw′′, thus w′′ =
w · i ·q /∈ Q(0, c′n), which can only occur when e|p1·w·i·q = e|p·q is basic, and we conclude
again.
Assume now 0c
′
n = 0. If 1c
′
n = 1, we conclude by the induction hypothesis: property
2 holds on cn.
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Otherwise, there are positions such that:
p · q = p1 · w1 · i1
w1〈prefw′1
p2 ∼cn p1
p2 · w′1 ∈ P(c′n)
e|p2·w′1 is not basic∀w′′1 ∈ Q(1, c′n), w1 · i1  〈prefw′′1
0
c′n = 0 implies p1  〈prefp. If p1〉prefp, from p1 ∼cn p2, we conclude that e|p1 is basic
(hence e|p·q ), thanks to the induction hypothesis.
We are left to the case p = p1. Then p2 ∼cn p and p2 · w′1 ∈ P(c′n) and w′1 is not
empty, hence 0c
′
n = 0, a contradiction. 
Lemma 78. Property 5 is satisﬁed for normal forms w.r.t. (N6).
Proof. At step 1, we ensured that, for every p ∈ (e), e|p only contains expressions of
the form f c1(e) ∩ . . . ∩ f cn(e) ∩ X1 ∩ . . . ∩ Xm. The rule (N6) imposes n = 1, hence
property 5. 
In this step, we did not increase |e|F and |c.c′|a× (|c|+ |c′|)2, hence |e′|ta×|e|2t .
Step 4: The purpose of this last step is to rearrange the equality tests so that there are no
overlapping tests except possibly for basic expressions. (More formally, we need to ensure
condition 6).
Let us show ﬁrst some examples of what we want.
Example 79. e def= f 11=12=2(f 11=12=21=22(f (X,X), f (X,X)), f (X,X)). e contains
overlapping tests. We can however use ﬁrst the rules (N4), (N2) and get
f 11=12=2(f 11=12=21=22(f 1=2(X,X), f 1=2(X,X)), f (X,X))
Now, it turns out that the intermediate test is a consequence of the top one and the lowest
ones, and it can be removed, yielding (after normalization w.r.t. (N2)):
f 11=12=2(f (f 1=2(X,X), f 1=2(X,X)), f 1=2(X,X))
for which there is no overlapping test.
In this example, pictured in Fig. 14, we see that we do not need to change the tests but only
to reorganize them.
Example 80. Let
e = f 111=121=112=122=2(f 1=2(g(X,X, Y ), g(X,X, Y )),X),
which contains overlapping tests. Using the rule (N4) we get
f c(f 1=2(g(X,X, Y ), g(X,X, Y )) ∩ f 11=12=21=22(g1=2(X,X, Y ),
×g1=2(X,X, Y )),X)
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Fig. 14. The tests of Example 79.
with c def= 111 = 121 = 112 = 122 = 2. Using rule (N6) we get
f 111=121=112=122=2(f 11=12=21=22∧13=23(g1=2(X,X, Y ), g1=2(X,X, Y )),X)
Now, the class 11 = 12 = 21 = 22 is a consequence of the top and low tests and it can be
removed:
f 111=121=112=122=2(f 13=23(g1=2(X,X, Y ), g1=2(X,X, Y )),X)
Finally the low tests can also be removed since they are consequences of the top one,
yielding:
f 111=121=112=122=2(f 13=23(g(X,X, Y ), g(X,X, Y )),X)
in which there is a remaining overlapping test. However, in e, Y must be basic (thanks to the
basicity condition) and thus the lower positions 13 and 23 correspond to basic expressions.
In this example, pictured in Fig. 15, we need to push some tests down.
So, the idea is to ﬁrst inherit the constraints thanks to rule (N4) (this has been done at
step 2), next normalize w.r.t. (N6) (this has been done at step 3) and ﬁnally remove useless
tests, which we do now.
(N7) f
c1( e1)[gc2∧c0( e2) ∩ e′2]p1 → f c1( e1)[gc2( e2) ∩ e′2]p1
If
• c0 is an equivalence class in c2 ∧ c0,
• c1 ∧ p1 · ∧
r∈(gc2∧c0 ( e2))
r =
gc2∧c0 ( e2)|r=hcr ( er )∩e′r
r · crec0,
• e = f c1( e1)[gc2∧c0( e2) ∩ e′2]p1 ,
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Fig. 15. The tests of Example 80.
• e is the consequence relation according to the following rules:
◦ reﬂexivity, symmetry and transitivity
◦ right compatibility: p = qep · r = q · r
◦ folding (w.r.t. e): if e|p = f c(e′)∩e′′ and f has arity n, thenp ·1 = q ·1∧ . . .∧p ·n =
q · nep = q.
◦ conjunction introduction: c1ec
′
1
c2ec′2
}
⇒ c1 ∧ c2ec′1 ∧ c′2.
We must be careful on how to apply this rule. Consider the following example
Example 81. e def= f 111=12=2(f 11=12=2(f 1=2(g(X), g(X)), g(X)), g(X)). This
expression is in normal form w.r.t. the previous transformations. There are two ways of
applying rule (N7): we can remove the constraint 1 = 2 since 11 = 12 = 2 ∧ 11 ·  ∧
12 · 1 · (1 = 2). Then the expression is in normal form for N7 and there are still some
overlapping tests. The other possibility is to apply (N7) to 11 = 12 = 2: 111 = 12 =
2 ∧ 1 · 1 · (1 = 2)  1 · (11 = 12 = 2) and there is no longer any overlapping tests in the
expression.
We assume that the previous steps have been completed and use the rule (N7) top-down.
Lemma 82. (N7) (applied top-down) is terminating, it preserves the semantics and the
properties 5, 3, 1, 4, 2.
Proof. The termination is straightforward: the size of the expression is strictly decreasing
(and the resulting expression e′ satisﬁes |e′|F = |e|F and |e′|t |e|t .)
The condition of the rule ensures the preservation of interpretations. Property 5 is pre-
served since we do not change the term structure of the expression. Property 3 is not
necessarily preserved by one-step application of (N7). However, if p0 · p1 = p0 · p′1 is
checked higher up in the expression, then the expressions at positions p1 and p′1 must
be identical (by property 3) and the rule (N7) will be applied twice to these expressions,
yielding removal of c0 for both occurrences.
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Lemma 72 ensures the preservation of property 1. Also, property 4 is preserved since we
remove an equivalence class and property 2 is preserved since we remove some
tests. 
Lemma 83. Normal forms w.r.t. rule (N7) (applied top-down) satisfy condition 6.
Proof. Assume that we are in the situation of property 6: e = f c(e1, . . . , en)∩e′,p1 ·p2 ∼c
q, p1, p2 are nonempty, f c(e1, . . . , en)|p1 = gc′(e′1, . . . , e′m) ∩ e′′ and p′ ∈ P(c′).
Assume that there is no position p′2 such that p1 · p′2 ∼c p1 · p2 and p′2 is comparable
with p′ w.r.t. pref . Let p1 · p′2 ∼c p1 · p2 such that p′2 is the position which shares the
longest preﬁx with p′ . Then we can write p′ = w · j · w′ and p′2 = w · i · w′′ with i = j .
By condition 1 (for c), considering p1 ·w · i ·w′′ ∼c p1 ·p2, either e|p1·p2 is basic or e|p1·p′
is basic or ∃w1, p1 · p2 ∼c p1 · w · j · w1. This last case contradicts the maximal shared
preﬁx hypothesis.
We are left to the case where p′ is comparable w.r.t. pref with some position p′2 such
that p1 · p′2 ∼c p1 · p2.
If p′ ∼c′ q ′ and q ′ does not share any nontrivial preﬁx with p′ (this is possible thanks to
property 4 on c′), then a similar property holds for q ′: we assume now that p′ ∼c′ q ′ and
there are positions p′2 and p′′2 such that p1 ·p2 ∼c p1 ·p′2 ∼c p1 ·p′′2 and p′ and p′2 on one
hand and q ′ and p′′2 on the other hand are comparable w.r.t. the preﬁx ordering. p′2 must be
distinct from p′′2 since p′ and q ′ do not share any preﬁx.
By rules (N4), (N6), c′ = c1 . . . . . cn and c1  p′2 = p′′2 . Now, we consider a number
of cases, depending on the comparisons between p′, q ′, p′2, q ′2:
Case 1: p′〈prefp′2.
In this case, by deﬁnition of ., e|p1·p′2 must be basic: c′ has to contain a sufﬁx of p′2 and
we use property 2 on c′. It follows that e|p1·p2 is basic.
Case 2: q ′〈prefp′′2 . This is similar to the ﬁrst case.
Case 3: p′prefp′2 and q ′prefp′′2 .
Let p′ = p′2 · q ′2. By deﬁnition of ., p′ ∼c′ p′′2 · q ′2. Then q ′ must be equal to
p′′2 · q ′2 and c  p1 · (p′ = q ′). Next, equalities p′ ∼c′ q ′′, in which p′ and q ′′ share
a non-trivial preﬁx must be consequences (w.r.t. e) of equality tests on subexpres-
sions: this is true for normal forms w.r.t. (N4) and this is an invariant of (N6) since
c . c′ec ∧ c′.
Then, rule N7 can be applied (contradiction). 
Appendix B. SET-constraints and automata with one memory
We consider a satisﬁable SET-constraint S and we assume that AS is constructed as
described in Section 5.3.
We can ﬁrst note that if e = f c(e1, . . . , en) occurs in S and if p is a non-root position of
e, then c ↓ p has only one nontrivial equivalence class. This is ensured by conditions 1, 4
and 2 of normal expressions (see Deﬁnition 27).
We prove by induction on the size of t that, if  is the solution of solved(S), then for
every t accepted in qX, H(t) ∈ (X).
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For the sake of simplicity, we will say shortly that “t is accepted in 〈q,m〉” instead of
“there is a computation of the automaton on t yielding the conﬁguration 〈q,m〉.
Lemma 84.
• if t is accepted in 〈qe,p, 〉, then H(t) ∈ (e|p), H(t)  c ↓ p and  = H(t)|p·p′ for
some p′ tested by c ↓ p (since H(t)  c ↓ p and since c ↓ p has only one nontrivial
equivalence class, for every p′, p′′ tested by c ↓ p, we have H(t)|p·p′ = H(t)|p·p′′ ).
• if t is accepted in 〈qe, 〉, then H(t) ∈ (e) and  = a.
• if t is accepted in 〈qX, 〉, then H(t) ∈ (X) and  = H(t).
• if t is accepted in 〈q, 〉, then .
• if t is accepted in 〈qa, 〉, then t = a and  = a.
Proof (sketch). If |t | = 1, then t = b for some constant inF and the only transition leading
to b is b −→
b
qb.
Assume Lemma 84 is satisﬁed for every t of size n and consider t such that |t | = n+1.
If t is accepted in 〈qe,p, 〉, then t = g(t1, . . . , tk) such that ti is accepted in 〈qe,p·i , i〉. By
induction hypothesis, H(ti) ∈ (e|p·i ), H(ti)  c ↓ p · i and  = H(ti)|p·i·p′ for some p′
tested by c ↓ p · i. H(t) = g(H(t1), . . . , H(tn)), thus H(t) ∈ (e|p). We have also that
H(t)c˜ ↓ p, thus H(t)  c ↓ p. Finally,  = i for some i such that p · i is a position
checked by c, thus  = H(t)|p·p′ for some p′ tested by c ↓ p.
The other cases are proved similarly. 
Conversely, if t ∈ (X) where  is the minimal solution of solved(S), then there exists
t ′ such that H(t) = t ′ and t ′ is accepted in state qX.
Lemma 85.
1. if t ∈ (X), then there exists t ′ such that H(t ′) = t and t ′ is accepted in 〈qX, t ′〉.
2. if t ∈ (e|p) and t  c ↓ p, then there exists t ′ such that H(t ′) = t and t ′ is accepted in
〈qe,p, t |p·p′ 〉 for some p′ tested by c ↓ p.
3. if t ∈ (e), then there exists t ′ such that H(t ′) = t and t ′ is accepted in 〈qe, a〉.
Proof (sketch). We prove that if T nsolved(S)(∅) satisﬁes the properties of Lemma 85, then
T n+1solved(S)(∅) also satisﬁes the properties of Lemma 85. The result follows by minimality
of .
Assume T nsolved(S)(∅) satisﬁes the properties of lemma 85. First, we can verify that if
T nsolved(S)(∅)   then there exists t ′ such that t ′ is accepted in state q. Assume now that
T n+1solved(S)(∅) satisﬁes property 1, then, by well-founded induction on  (the reverse preﬁx
order), we show that T n+1solved(S)(∅) satisﬁes properties 2 and 3.
Thus, it is sufﬁcient to prove that T n+1solved(S)(∅) satisﬁes property 1: assume t ∈ [[X]]n,
then there exists a clause  ⇒ e ⊆ X such that T nsolved(S)(∅)   and t ∈ [[e]]n. Applying
the induction hypothesis and the rules of the automaton, we deduce that there exists t ′ such
that H(t ′) = t and t ′ is accepted in 〈qX, t ′〉. 
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Appendix C. Protocols and Horn Clauses
Let P be a protocol. We assume HMsg,HI and HP constructed as described in
Section 6.2.
We ﬁrst construct HI0 such that the maximal initial knowledge of the intruder I0 is a
minimal interpretation of the predicate I0 which satisﬁesHI0 .
Lemma 58. Let t1, . . . , tn be message schemes with the free variables x1, . . . , xk . Then,
there exists a set of Horn clausesHI0 such that I0(m) is derivable fromHI0 ∪Hmsg if and
only if parts(m) ∩ {ti | 1 in,(xi) ∈ Ah} = ∅.
Proof. Let p be the maximal depth of the terms t1, . . . , tn. Let S = {ti | 1 in,(xi) ∈
Ah}. We introduce a new predicate Pp such that Pp accepts the terms of depth larger
or equal to p. The clauses HI0 for Pp and I0 are described in Fig. 16. |m|d denotes the
depth of the term m. LetH′ = HMsg ∪HI0 .
By construction,H′Pp(m) if and only if the depth of m is greater or equal to p.
Let us showby induction on the number of ruleswhich have been applied that ifH′I0(m)
then parts(m) ∩ S = ∅. Let m be a term such that H′I0(m) and let us consider the last
rule which has been applied:
Rule 1. parts(m) ∩ S = ∅ by deﬁnition of rule (1).
Rule 4. m = f (m1, . . . , mn) such that f ∈ IF , H′I0(m1), . . . , I0(mn) and there exists
i such thatH′Pp(mi).
parts(m) = {m} ∪ ⋃
1 in
parts(mi).
By induction hypothesis,parts(mi)∩S = ∅. In addition, there exists i such that |mi |dp,
thus |m|d〉p which implies that m ∈ S. Thus parts(m) ∩ S = ∅.
Rule 5. m = f (m1, . . . , mn) such that f ∈ OF and there exists i such thatH′Pp(mi),
thus |m|d〉p. Since parts(m) = {m} and |m|d〉p, we have parts(m) ∩ S = ∅.
Rule 6. this case is similar to the previous ones.
Conversely, an induction on the depth ofm proves that if parts(m)∩S = ∅, thenH′I0(m).

We prove here Lemma 57 by proving the following stronger lemma.
Lemma 86. Let m be a message and a an agent, C3I (m) iff there exists a reachable H
such that [m] ∈ H and
C3I (si(a,m)) iff there exists a reachable H such that S(a, i,m) ∈ H .
To prove this, we need few lemmas:
Lemma 87. If there exists a reachable H1 such that m1 ∈ H1 where m1 is a message and
if there exists a reachable H2 such that e2 ∈ H2 where e2 is either a message or a state,
then there exists a reachable H such that m1, e2 ∈ H .
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(1)
I0(m)
if |m|d p
and parts(m) ∩ S = ∅
(2)
Pp(m)
if |m|d = p
(3)
Msg(x1) . . .Msg(xn) Pp(xi )
Pp(f (x1, . . . , xn)
1 in
(4)
I0(x1) . . . I0(xn) Pp(xi )
I0(f (x1, . . . , xn))
1 in, f ∈ IF
(5)
Msg(x1) . . .Msg(xn) Pp(xi )
I0(f (x1, . . . , xn))
1 in, f ∈ OF
(6)
I0(x1) Msg(x2) Pp(xi )
I0({x1}x2 )
i = 1, 2
Fig. 16. Horn clauses for Pp and I0.
A transition t of a protocol is applicable inH providedPre(t) ⊆ H . Thus, if t is applicable
inH , then t is applicable inH ′, for allH ′ ⊇ H . In the sameway, ifX ∈ fake(Cont(H) ∪ I )
then X ∈ fake(Cont(H ′) ∪ I ), for all H ′ ⊇ H .
Therefore, letH be the global state obtained fromH1 by applying all the transitions used to
obtainH2. e2 is inH andm1 is still inH since the transitions do not remove any message.
Lemma 88. Let S a set of messages such that ∀m ∈ S C3m. Then ∀m ∈ fake(S),
C3m.
Pairing, unpairing, encryption and decryption are simulated by the clauses in Fig. 8.
For Lemma 57, we ﬁrst prove by induction on n that if CnI (m) then there exists a
reachableH such that [m] ∈ H and if CnI (si(a,m)) then there exists a reachableH such
that S(a, i,m) ∈ H .
For n = 0, it is true,
Assume the hypothesis is veriﬁed for n, and assume Cn+1I (m). The last deduction rule
is either one of those presented in Fig. 8, in this case, by inspection of the deduction rules,
using the induction hypothesis and Lemma 87, we conclude that there exists a reachableH
such that [m] ∈ H . Or the last deduction rule is one of those presented in Fig. 9. Then,
CnI (si(a,m0)),Msg(m0), I (m1),Msg(m1), . . . , I (mp),Msg(mp),
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where mi = Mi′, m0 = M0′ and ′ preserves the type : if ′(xA) = t where A is an
agent variable, then CnA(t), thus t is an agent. By application of the induction hypothesis
and applying Lemma 87, there exists a reachable H such that m,m1, . . . , mp ∈ H . Thus,
the transition
t = {S(A′, i,M′),M1′, . . . ,Mp′} −→
{S(A′, i + 1,M ′′),M ′1′, . . . ,M ′q′}
is applicable in H . Let H ′ the global state obtained from H by applying t , m is in H ′.
Assume Cn+1I (si(a,m)). The only choice for the last deduction rule is one those pre-
sented in Fig. 9. The same reasoning as above allows us to conclude that there exists a
reachable H such that S(a, i,m) ∈ H .
Conversely, we prove by induction on n that if there exists a n-reachable H such that
[m] ∈ H or S(a, i,m) ∈ H then C3I (m) or C3I (si(a,m)) where n-reachable stands for
“reachable with n global transitions”.
For n = 0, H = H0 and H0 does not contain any message or state.
Assume the hypothesis is veriﬁed for n, and assume there exists a n + 1-reachable H
such that [m] ∈ H . Thus, there exists a n-reachable H1 such that H is an honest or fake
successor of H ′. If [m] ∈ H ′, we conclude immediately. Assume [m] ∈ H ′:
Honest successor. Let t the applicable transition such that H = (H ′\(Pre(t) ∩ H ′) ∪
Post(t)). By application of the induction hypothesis and applying the clause described
in Fig. 9, we conclude C3I (m).
Fake successor. If H = H ′ ∪ {m} where H ′ is n-reachable and m ∈ fake(Cont(H) ∪ I ).
Lemma 88 and the induction hypothesis allows us to conclude.
References
[1] M. Abadi, A. Gordon, A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus, Inform. Comput. 148 (1)
(1999) 1–70.
[2] A. Aiken, Introduction to set constraint-based program analysis, Sci. Comput. Program. 35 (1999) 79–111.
[3] R.Amadio,D. Lugiez, On the reachability problem in cryptographic protocols, in Proc. CONCUR’00, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1877, 2000.
[4] B. Bogaert, S. Tison, Equality and disequality constraints on brother terms in tree automata, in: A. Finkel
(Ed.), Porc. 9th Symp. on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Cachan, France, 1992.
[5] I. Cervesato, N. Durgin, P. Lincoln, J. Mitchell, A. Scedrov, A meta-notation for protocol analysis, in: P.
Syverson (Ed.), 12th IEEE Computer Security FoundationsWorkshop, IEEE Computer Society Press, Silver
Spring, MD, 1999.
[6] W. Charatonik, L. Pacholski, Negative set constraints with equality, in: Proc. IEEE Symp. on Logic in
Computer Science, Paris, 1994, pp. 128–136.
[7] W. Charatonik, A. Podelski, Set constraints with intersection, in: Proc. IEEE Symp. on Logic in Computer
Science, Warsaw, 1997.
[8] J. Clarke, J. Jacobs, A survey of authentication protocol literature: Version 1.0, Draft paper, 1997.
[9] H. Comon, V. Cortier, Tree automata with one memory, set constraints and cryptographic protocols, Res.
Report LSV-01-13, Laboratoire Spéciﬁcation and Vériﬁcation, ENS de Cachan, France, December 2001.
[10] H. Comon, V. Cortier, J. Mitchell, Tree automata with one memory, set constraints and ping-pong protocols,
in: Proc. 28th Int. Coll. Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP’01), Crete, Greece, July 2001.
[11] H. Comon, M. Dauchet, R. Gilleron, F. Jacquemard, D. Lugiez, S. Tison, M. Tommasi, Tree automata
techniques and applications, available on: http://www.grappa.univ-lille3.fr/tata, 1997
214 H. Comon, V. Cortier / Theoretical Computer Science 331 (2005) 143–214
[12] H. Comon, V. Shmatikov, Is it possible to decide whether a cryptographic protocol is secure or not?, J.
Telecomm. Inform. Tech. 4 (2002) 5–15.
[13] V. Cortier, J. Millen, Harald Ruess, Proving Secrecy is easy enough, 14th IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Workshop, Cape Breton, 2001, p. 97–108.
[14] N. Dershowitz, J. Jouannaud, Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. B, Chap. Rewrite Systems,
Elsevier, 1990, pp. 243–320.
[15] D. Dolev, S. Even, R. Karp, On the security of ping pong protocols, Inform. Control 55 (1982) 57–68.
[16] D. Dolev,A.Yao, On the security of public key protocols, in: Proc. IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer
Science, 1981, p. 350–357.
[17] C. Dufourd, A. Finkel, Ph. Schnoebelen, Reset nets between decidability and undecidability, in: Proc. 25th
Int. Coll.Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP’98),Aalborg, Denmark, July 1998, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, Vol. 1443, Springer, Berlin, 1998, pp. 103–115.
[18] N. Durgin, P. Lincoln, J. Mitchell, A. Scedrov, Undecidability of bounded security protocols, in: Proc.
Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Protocols, Trento, Italy, 1999.
[19] S. Even, O. Goldreich, On the security of multi-party ping-pong protocols, Tech. Report 285, Technion,
Haifa, Israel, 1983. Extended abstract appeared in IEEE Symp. Foundations of Computer Science, 1983.
[20] N. Heinze, J. Jaffar, A decision procedure for a class of set constraints, in: Proc. IEEE Symp. on Logic in
Computer Science, Philadelphia, 1990, pp. 42–51.
[21] N. Heintze, J. Tygar, A model for secure protocols and their compositions, IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 22 (1)
(1996).
[22] G. Lowe, Breaking and ﬁxing the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR, in: Proc. Tools and
Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS), T. Margaria, B. Steffen (Eds.), Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1055, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1996, pp. 147–166.
[23] J. Millen, H. Ruess, Protocol-Independent Secrecy, in: Proc. Workshop on Formal Methods in Computer
Security, Chicago, 2000.
[24] J. Millen, V. Shmatikov, Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis, in: Proc.
8th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security, 2001, pp. 166–175.
[25] J. Mongy, Transformation de noyaux reconnaissables d’arbres. Forêts RATEG. Ph.D. thesis, Laboratoire
d’Informatique Fondamentale de Lille, Université des Sciences et Technologies de Lille, Villeneuve d’Ascq,
France, 1981.
[26] L. Paulson, The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols, J. Comput. Security 6 (1998)
85–128.
[27] M. Rusinowitch, M. Turuani, Protocol insecurity with ﬁnite number of sessions is NP complete, in: Proc.
14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2001, pp. 174–190.
[28] H. Seidl, Haskell overloading is DEXPTIME-complete, Inf. Process. Lett. 52 (1994) 57–60.
